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Summary
With the advent of the world-wide-web, e-commerce and broadband connectivity to 
the home, electronic distribution of digital multimedia including music, photographs and 
movies, has been growing rapidly. Although there are many advantages, these technologies 
can create a serious problem for copyright holders. Consequently, protection for 
multimedia distribution against piracy is needed. A part of the solution is to use a 
watermark indicating content owner or distribution route, which is transparently and 
robustly embedded into the material.
This thesis discusses several problems in watermarking design, including the 
imperceptibility and robustness to a variety of attacks. In particular, the StirMark random 
geometric attack is difficult to counter. Subsequently, several robust and transparent 
watermarking schemes for images and video and also an image confidentiality protection 
scheme, are presented. The original contributions can be summarized as follows.
First, a robustness improvement of an existing scheme, namely watermarking by 
complementary modulation, is introduced. One existing method based on this to combat 
the StirMark random geometric attack, is shown to be invalid. Next, a new valid method to 
combat this random geometric attack is presented.
Other methods of robust image watermarking, which consider the image texture, are 
proposed. By using these schemes, the watermark can be embedded in either low, high or 
both textures. Afterwards, an oblivious or blind detection method is suggested. This 
oblivious method can be used in conjunction with the previously described methods or can 
be used also with other existing methods.
The above approaches are extended into video watermarking. A method to increase 
the imperceptibility by exploiting the human visual sensitivity is also designed. 
Subsequently, a method to detect video scene characteristic to suit a particular embedding 
scheme is presented.
Finally, an efficient method to protect image confidentiality based on camouflaging 
and selective encryption, is introduced.
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Chapter 1
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Digital multimedia, including music, photographs and movies, have proliferated 
during the last decade with the advent of the world wide web, e-commerce, and broadband 
connectivity to home. This technical and economic revolution has introduced in a new 
world for content creators, publishers, distributors, and consumers. There are many 
advantages of digital media, including efficient storage and manipulation, fast and 
inexpensive distribution, and the ability to customize the media to each unique user. 
However, these advantages are tempered by serious concerns regarding illegal copying, the 
viability of new e-commerce business models, and the uncertainty surrounding newly 
enacted copyright law [19].
For copyright holders, illegal copying implies serious financial loss. As reported by 
Miller et al [74] in 1998, the International Intellectual Property Alliance (DPA) estimates 
the annual lost revenues in the US motion picture industry due to piracy at US$1.3 billion, 
and for the record and music industries at US$1.7 billion.
Thus, it is obvious that multimedia distribution systems need to provide protection. 
This can be achieved by employing digital rights management (DRM) systems, designed 
to control and restrict access to multimedia data. This typically includes encryption, access 
control, and key management [43].
Cryptography has been the cornerstone of technologies used to protect intellectual 
property rights. For example, cable and satellite television signals are commonly 
scrambled to prevent unauthorized viewing. Encrypting compressed video formats, such as 
MPEG, can be achieved by using either a symmetric algorithm such as DES or a public 
key system such as RSA [93]. Symmetric algorithms, sometimes called conventional 
algorithms, require the sender and receiver to agree on a key before they can communicate 
securely; the security rests in this key. In an asymmetric algorithm the key used for
1
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encryption is different from the key used for decryption. This method is also called a 
public key system, because the encryption key can be made public, so that anyone can use 
the public key to encrypt a message, but only a specific person with the corresponding 
decryption key can decrypt the message [93].
As a symmetric algorithm has much a faster processing time and has a shorter 
messages than a public key system [93], many schemes using this method to encrypt a 
video have been proposed such as in [109,99,104]. However, a public key can be utilized 
in conjunction with the symmetric algorithm such as proposed by Bao [15]. In such a 
scheme, to improve the security the multimedia file is encrypted by the symmetric 
algorithm, then the symmetric key is encrypted by the public key before sending it to the 
recipient.
Since many real time applications need high encryption and decryption processing 
time, selective algorithms which encrypt only some part of the MPEG frames such as the I 
frame, headers, or several discrete cosine transform (DCT) coefficients, are preferred. 
These methods provide fast speed, moderate security, and some size increment [90]. 
Another scheme called video encryption algorithm (VEA) attempts to overcome the 
drawbacks by presenting a method with high security, fast speed and no file size increase 
[89].
With the growth of image communication, such as attached pictures in emails sent 
through the internet, the necessity of protecting image confidentiality is as high as in video 
security. Furthermore, an image encryption can be utilized also for protecting privacy such 
as medical image databases which, according to the law, should not be disclosed to any 
unauthorized person [29]. Either symmetric or public key algorithms can be employed for 
this application.
However, apart from its sophistication, cryptography only protects the work during 
transmission or distribution. It provides no protection after the work is decrypted and all 
work must eventually be decrypted if consumers are to enjoy the photograph, music, or 
movie [19]. Thus many digital right management (DRM) systems also include copy 
control mechanisms. However, copy control or prevention is difficult to achieve, especially 
in open systems. Identification and back-tracing of individual copies of multimedia data 
(similar to serial numbers for computer software) has also been proposed as a last line of 
defence against unauthorized copying. It can not prevent copying, but it can at least help
Chapter 1. Introduction
identify the source of pirated copies, and thus enable legal action. A key technology used 
in DRM systems for data identification, and also for copy control, is digital watermarking 
[43].
With a digital watermarking approach, protection is achieved by embedding a piece 
of information, i.e. the watermark, within the to-be protected data (host or cover 
document). Generally, the embedded watermark must be imperceptible so that the quality 
of the document is not affected by the presence of the watermark. This information 
remains in the material after decryption and even after conversion to the analog format. At 
any given moment the embedded information can be extracted to prove ownership, to 
ensure integrity, or simply to get some copyright related information [20]. It should be 
noted that as we integrate the security information into the media data, we can ensure the 
confidentiality of security information using a secret key, but not the confidentiality of the 
media data itself [33].
The idea of watermarking is related to steganography, techniques which allow secret 
communication, usually by embedding or hiding the secret information in other, 
unsuspected, data. Steganographic methods generally do rely on the assumption that the 
existence of the covert communication is unknown to third parties and are mainly used in 
secret point to point communication between trusting parties. As a result, steganographic 
methods are in general not robust, i.e., the hidden information cannot be recovered after 
data manipulation.
Watermarking, as opposed to steganography, has the additional notion of robustness 
against attacks. Even if the existence of the hidden information is known and the 
algorithmic principle of the watermarking method is public, it is difficult for an attacker to 
destroy the embedded watermark [44].
Thus, the basic requirements that digital watermarking has to fulfil are:
• Robustness: the watermark must persist in the data after manipulation, 
including malicious manipulation with the intent to remove the watermark.
• Imperceptibility: the watermark must not impair the perceived quality of the 
data
• Security: the watermark should only be accessible by authorized parties
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Depending on the application, the watermark needs to survive all the possible 
manipulations the host data may undergo, with the only constraint being that 
manipulations must not degrade too much the quality of the document [20].
However, there are other types of watermarking system. Fragile watermarking has 
the opposite characteristics from the robust watermarking described above and it is used to 
detect tampering. The fragile watermark is transparently embedded throughout the entire 
image or video so that if there is any data being modified, the system can notify and locate 
the alteration [17]. This is analogous to digital signatures in cryptography [93] which can 
detect whether the received message is corrupted.
Another type is called semi-fragile watermarking [65] which combines the properties 
of fragile and robust watermarks. Like a robust watermark, a semi-fragile watermark is 
capable of tolerating some degree of change to the watermarked image, such as the 
addition of quantization noise from lossy compression. And like a fragile watermark, the 
semi-fragile watermark is capable of localizing regions of the image that have been 
tampered with and distinguishing them from regions that are still authentic. These fragile 
and semi-fragile watermarking are outside the scope of this thesis.
Regarding robust watermarking, in addition to copyright protection there are several 
other possible applications. If the objective is to convey information about the legal 
recipient rather than the source of digital data, mainly to identify single distributed copies 
of data, this is usually called fingerprinting. This application involves the embedding of a 
different watermark into each distributed copy.
In broadcast applications. Mason et al [72] described quite comprehensive list of 
watermarking i.e.:
• Rights and Metadata
By identifying program material within the studio environment, one can ensure 
that the contractual agreements concerning the rights are met. An identifier can 
be embedded to each item of the programme material and it is linked to a record 
in a database so that the broadcaster can trace the use of performing rights.
• Rights and Copyright
In the broadcasting context, the watermark in a programme would identify the 
original broadcaster and enable the detection of unauthorized re-use of
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programme material. There are some possibilities of legal violations, for instance 
programmes licensed to a broadcaster are shown more often than was agreed. 
Alternatively, programmes licensed for broadcast in one geographical area might 
be broadcast in other areas, or, the programme material might be recorded off air 
and re-broadcast by another broadcaster without authorisation. Moreover illegal 
tape recordings of programmes might be sold on the market.
• Audience Research and Advertising
As broadcasters are interested in the audience size, knowing accurately how 
many people are tuning in is very important for justifying advertising rates or 
license fees. A small, portable watermark detector could be used to record the 
audience viewing or listening habits. This can be more accurate than using 
questionnaire sheets.
The major requirement in watermarking is robustness against attacks. Absolute 
robustness against all possible attacks and their combinations may be impossible to 
achieve. Thus, the practical requirement is that any attack must degrade the host data, to 
the point of significantly reducing its commercial value, before the watermark becomes 
non-recoverable. The attacks can be simple attacks such as filtering, compression, or 
conversion to analog. Alternatively, they can be detection-disabling attacks which attempt 
to break correlation and to make the recovery of the watermark impossible or infeasible for 
a watermark detector. The latter type of attacks are mostly performed by geometric 
distortion such as zooming, shifting, rotating, shearing or cropping [44].
One of the benchmark to evaluate the robustness of image watermarking schemes 
was proposed by Petitcolas et al [81,82]. In this package, called StirMark, several attacks 
including filtering, scaling, cropping, rotation, compression and geometric alteration can 
be utilized for testing.
Robustness to global affine transformations is more or less a solved issue. However, 
resistance to the local random alterations integrated in StirMark still remains an open 
problem for most commercial watermarking tools [101]. The so-called random bending 
attack in Stirmark exploits the fact that the human visual system (HVS) is not sensitive to 
local shift and affine modifications. Therefore, pixels are locally shifted, scaled, and 
rotated without significant visual distortion.
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As transparency or imperceptibility of the embedded watermark is also required, the 
techniques of implanting the watermark in the area where the human visual (for image or 
video) or human auditory (for music/audio) system is less sensitive, are employed. A 
masking criterion deduced from physiological and psychophysical studies might be used to 
improve the transparency [32].
1.2 Objectives
From the above brief explanation, it is obvious that reliable methods for protecting 
the security of multimedia works are needed, and this thesis addresses such problems. The 
main objective of this thesis is to develop robust and transparent watermarking systems for 
image and video copyright protection. As the StirMark random geometric attack is one of 
the most demanding to combat, and there are few counter attacks in existence, robustness 
against this attack has been set as a main priority. Nevertheless, the designed systems have 
to be robust against other common attacks as well. Moreover, enhancement of the quality, 
in terms of the watermark transparency, is also an aim. In addition, to provide protection 
for copyright as well as confidentiality during transmission, image encryption methods are 
also planned.
It should be noted, however, that the robustness and imperceptibility of 
watermarking schemes is parts of a total solution. Other complementary approaches, which 
are not covered by this thesis, such as secure key management or other protocols, are 
needed and these are specific depending on the application.
1.3 Structure of Thesis
In this first chapter, a background to the need for protecting the ownership and 
securing the communication of multimedia data has been described and the objectives 
defined. Now the structure of the thesis will be explained, and finally the original 
achievements are summarized.
Chapter two, which provides an introduction to digital watermarking, consists of two 
main parts, namely a literature review of watermarking and experimental work based on 
some existing methods. In the first part, several terminologies, watermarking basic design, 
requirements, problems, and some existing methods will be described. In the second part 
several simulation results of the DCT and DWT spread spectrum image watermarking as
6
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well as in the complementary modulation are presented. Test results for their robustness 
using several attacks are also provided. In addition, one of the existing methods of 
oblivious detection and its performance will be reviewed.
Chapter three presents our enhancement of an existing method and a method to 
counter attack the StirMark. First, a robustness improvement of an existing scheme, 
namely watermarking by complementary modulation, is introduced. Then, our comment 
regarding one of the methods to combat the StirMark random geometric attack is given. 
Next, a new method to combat this random geometric attack is presented.
In chapter four other methods of image watermarking with three embedding 
possibilities, which are also robust against StirMark, are proposed. Then, an oblivious or 
blind detection method is suggested. This oblivious method can be used in conjunction 
with the previously described methods or can be used also with other existing methods.
Chapter five presents video digital watermarking methods. Approaches of image 
watermarking which are described in chapter four are extended for the application to 
video. Several experimental results on attacks that were applied to test the method’s 
robustness are reported. Then, a method to increase the imperceptibility by exploiting the 
human visual sensitivity is designed. Next, based on the subjective tests that were carried 
out to several assessors, it is shown that different video sequences may need different 
watermark embedding approaches. Thus, a method to detect video scene characteristic to 
suit a particular embedding scheme is presented.
In chapter six, an efficient method to protect the confidentiality for images based on 
camouflaging and selected encryption is introduced. This encryption method can be 
employed in conjunction with watermarking so that both the confidentiality and copyright 
can be protected.
Finally chapter seven provides the conclusions and offers several ideas for future
work.
1.4 Original Work
The original work in this thesis can be summarized as follows:
• Robustness improvement on an existing watermarking scheme, i.e. DWT image 
watermarking using complementary modulation.
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• Comments on a previous method to combat random geometric attack.
• A method for combating random geometric attack by image pixels replacement.
• Three methods for image robust watermarking based on block DCT by considering the 
texture.
• An oblivious / blind detection method by image pre-processing.
• Extension of the proposed image watermarking schemes into robust video
watermarking
• Imperceptibility improvement on video watermarking
• A method for detecting video characteristic to suit particular watermarking scheme.
• ' A method for image confidentiality protection by camouflaging and encryption.
Most of the above work has been published in the journals, conferences, and also filed in
the UK patent office. The details are as follow:
Journals:
• Agung, I.W., Sweeney, P.: “Method for Combating Random Geometric Attack on
Image Watermarking”, lEE Electronics Letters, Vol. 37, No. 7, 29 March, 2001, pp.
420-421
• Agung, I.W., Sweeney, P.: “Oblivious Robust Watermarking Method By Image Pre-
Processing”, lEE Electronics Letters, Vol. 38, No. 14, July 2002, pp. 702-704
Conferences:
• Agung, I.W., Sweeney, P. “Improvement and Comments on Image Watermarking
Using Complementary Modulation”, The Second IEEE Pacific-Rim Conference on 
Multimedia (PCM-2001), 24-26 October 2001, Beijing, China
• Agung, I.W., Sweeney, P., 'Robust and transparent image watermarking resilient to 
random geometric attack'. Proceedings of lASTED International Conference on Signal
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Processing, Pattern Recognition, and Applications (SPPRA 2002), 25-28 June 2002, 
Crete, Greece
• Agung, I.W., Sweeney, P., “Image Confidentiality Protection by Camouflaging and 
Encryption”, IEEE Mini-Workshop on Topics in Information Theory, September 12- 
13, 2002, Essen, Germany
Patent:
Agung, I.W., Sweeney, P.: “Digital Watermarking”, UK Patent application, filed on 
December 2001, application number 0130591.1.
In addition, a paper has been submitted to:
Journal:
Agung,I.W., Sweeney,P.: “Robust, Transparent and Adaptive Video Digital
Watermarking for Copyright Protection”, submitted to lEE Proceedings: Vision, Image 
and Signal Processing, PdcpQvFlxiimbQr 3A911
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Chapter 2
2 Introduction to Digital Watermarking
2.1 Introduction
The necessity for multimedia material confidentiality and ownership protection has 
been described in the previous chapter. As the greater part of this thesis is in relation to 
digital watermarking, this chapter is provided for introducing several essential issues in 
watermarking. This chapter consists of two main parts, namely the literature survey and 
experimental work based on several existing algorithms.
Section 2.2 provides basic watermarking design. Section 2.3 describes embedding 
domain and methods to improve the robustness, i.e. by applying diversity or error 
correcting codes. Transparency or imperceptibility related issues are described in section 
2.4. Attack classification and several common attacks are explained in section 2.5. 
Watermarking detection methods are explained in section 2.6 whereas false detection 
probability and threshold setting method are given in section 2.7. Another issue, 
,watermarking in conjunction with encryption is described in section 2.8.
Examples of spread spectrum watermarking schemes in DCT and DWT domains are 
explained in sections 2.9 and 2.10 respectively. Experiments based on these schemes are 
given in section 2.11. Explanation of another existing scheme, watermarking with 
complementary modulation, followed by experimental work will be given in section 2.12. 
An oblivious detection method and its performance based on the experiment is presented 
in section 2.13. Finally, section 2.14 will conclude this chapter.
2.2 Basic Watermarking Design
There are three main issues in the design of watermarking system [44];
a. Design of the watermark signal W (or sometimes called payload) to be added to the 
. host signal.
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Typically, the watermark signal depends on a key k  and watermark information I
( 2-1)
Possibly, it may also depend on the host data X  into which it is embedded
( 2-2)
b. Design of the embedding method itself to incorporate the watermark signal W  into the 
host data X, yielding watermarked data Y
(2-3)
c. Design of the corresponding extraction method that recovers the watermark 
information from the signal mixture using the key. This may be with the help of the 
original
(2-4)
or without the original
I  = g(Y,K) (2-5)
The first two issues, watermark signal design and watermark signal embedding, are often 
regarded as one, specifically for methods where the embedded watermark is host signal 
adaptive.
Watermark
Data
Key
Watermark
Embedding
Watermarked
Data
Figure 2-1: Generic Digital Watermarking Embedding Scheme [44]
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Watermark and / or 
Original Image
Test data Watermarkw Recovery w
1
Watermark
or
Confidence measure
Key
Figure 2-2: Generic Watermark Recovery/Detection Scheme [44]
Figure 2-1 shows the embedding process, where the inputs are the watermark, host data 
and optional public or secret key. The host data may be in uncompressed or compressed 
format and the watermark can be of any nature such as number (either real or binary), text 
or an image/logo. The output of the scheme are the modified, i.e., watermarked data.
The watermarking recovery is shown in Figure 2-2. The inputs are the watermarked 
data, key, and depending on the method, the original data and the original watermark. The 
output of this process is either the recovered watermark or some kind of confidence 
measure indicating how likely it is for the given watermark at the input to be present in the 
data under inspection. This detection issue will be described in more detail in section 2.6.
Many proposed watermarking schemes use ideas borrowed from spread spectrurn 
radio communications. In this method, the watermark is embedded by adding a 
pseudonoise (PN) signal with low amplitude to the host data. This specific PN signal can 
later on be detected using a correlation. Examples of this method followed by our 
experimental work will be elaborated in the sections 2.10 to 2.13.
2.3 Embedding Domain and Robustness Improvement
A colour image is represented in electronic form in terms of component signals. A 
colour can be synthesized by combining the three colour primaries: red, green and blue 
(RGB). The RGB colour component system is one means of representing colour images. 
Alternatively, an image can be represented by the luminance and chrominance. The 
luminance or luma (Y) is the perceived intensity of the image derived from the RGB 
amplitudes and is calculated by [46]:
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7=0.299i? + 0.587G + 0.115 (2-6)
Chrominance or chroma is the perceived colour of the image and can be represented by:
[7 = 0.493 ( g - y )  (2-7)
y  = 0 .8 7 7 (/? -F )  (2-8)
These equations are used in the YUV colour space. Another colour model, defined in the 
CCIR 601 recommendation, is YCbCr where Y is the same as luminance component stated 
in equation (2-6) and Cb and Cr are:
=1.144[/ (2-9)
Cr = 0.8137 (2-10)
In watermarking, the data can be embedded on the luminance channel or/and on the 
colour channel of image or video by using its spatial or transform domain. In the spatial 
domain, the watermark data are embedded directly by changing the image brightness or 
colour.' In transform domain, several transforms such as Discrete Fourier [48,79,92], 
Discrete Cosine [26,96,51,86], Discrete Wavelet [18,60,110], Fractal [21], Hadamard [36], 
Lapped-Orthogonal [80], or Radon [107] transform can be utilized. In general, watermark 
embedding in transform domain has similar principle. First, the two dimensional transform 
is applied to the image and several coefficients are selected. Subsequently, the watermark
is embedded into these coefficients either by additive or multiplicative approach [20].
Finally, an inverse transform is employed to produce a watermarked image.
There are several advantages and disadvantages of both the spatial and transform 
domain approaches. However, the methods in the transform domain are more popular for 
the following reasons. The features of human visual system (HVS) can be incorporated 
into watermarking in the transform domain more effectively. Also, the energy of the 
embedded signal in the transform domain will be spread over all pixels in the spatial 
domain. In addition, this can be implemented in a compressed domain since most 
international image and video compression standards, such as JPEG and MPEG, are 
transform based [52].
A commonly used domain for embedding a watermark is the discrete cosine 
transform (DCT). Using the DCT, an image can easily be split up into pseudo frequency 
bands, so that the watermark can conveniently be embedded in the most important 
frequency bands. Furthermore, a block-based DCT is widely used for image and video
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compression. By embedding the watermark in the same domain as the compression 
scheme used to process the image (in this case the DCT), attacks due to lossy compression 
can be anticipated [64].
Another widely used embedding domain is the discrete wavelet transform (DWT). In 
terms of the imperceptibility requirement, this is very attractive transform because it can be 
used as a computationally efficient version of the frequency models for the HVS [18]. For 
example, it appears that the human eye is less sensitive to noise in high resolution DWT 
bands and in the DWT bands having an orientation of 45° (i.e. HH bands). Examples of 
watermarking in the DCT and DWT domains will be elaborated in sections 2.9 and 2.10 
respectively.
In video watermarking, the watermark data can be embedded in the transform 
coefficients of its uncompressed or compressed format. The watermarking for 
uncompressed video in the wavelet transform was proposed by Swanson et al [97] and 
Inoue et at [53], whereas Chae et al [23] presented watermarking for uncompressed video 
in the DCT domain.
Langelaar et al [63] offered two methods of MPEG compressed video watermarking. 
The first method is by replacing variable length codes and the second method is based on 
discarding parts of the compressed video stream.
Hartung et al [42] proposed a method for watermarking of MPEG-2 compressed 
video by embedding the watermark into the DCT coefficients of the MPEG-2 bit stream 
without increasing the bit rate. The watermarks are embedded into the DC coefficients of 
intra blocks and AC coefficients of both intra and inter blocks.
Arena et al [14] enhanced the above watermarking method in two ways. The first is 
complexity reduction by watermarking only the I (intra-coded) frames. The second is by 
exploiting the human visual system (HVS) to increase watermarking energy, without 
sacrificing the invisibility. '
One general way to improve reliability in an unknown environment is to employ 
diversity. In communications, this approach involves transmitting the same information 
through multiple sub-channels to better guarantee information reception. For 
watermarking, Kundur [61] introduced diversity by repeatedly embedding the watermark 
through the host signal. This method is Called ’coefficient diversity’, because it embeds the 
same watermark in different DWT coefficients. The sacrifice in employing diversity is the
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bit rate expense because the same information is sent through M orthogonal resources. 
However, for many watermarking applications, the payload is small. Furthermore, for 
video watermarking there exists an abundance of data in which to embed the information.
Another diversity method was proposed in [8] by dividing a host image into two 
sub-images, one in the central part and the other contains the rest of the original image, 
then embed the same watermark into both parts. The reason for dividing the image into 
two parts is to mitigate the effect of attacks that involve cropping, where the central sub­
image is more robust against this attack. Then, another reason is to combat attacks that 
affect mostly the central part of the image, where these attacks do not affect the other sub­
image too much. In this method, the watermark is embedded in the global DCT 
coefficients and the block by block DCT coefficients for the central sub-image and the 
other sub-image respectively.
Lu et al [66,67,68] observed that an arbitrary attack usually tends to increase or 
decrease the magnitudes of the majority of the transformed coefficients. In other words, 
there is very low chance that an attack will make the number of increased and of decreased 
coefficients equal. Therefore, they proposed a diversity scheme which aims to detect the 
watermark from the less distorted coefficients. They use two different modulation rules: 
positive modulation and negative modulation. This method will be elaborated in section 
2.12, whereas our improvement of this scheme will be described in chapter three.
Another method to improve the watermarking robustness, if the watermark is binary, 
is by using error control coding. Basically, any type of error correcting code can be used in 
watermarking. Performance improvement of spatial image, watermarking using BCH codes 
was presented by Hernandez et al [47]. Ambroze et al [9], reported that FEC based on 
multiple parallel concatenated convolutional codes can give an order improvement in 
capacity for compressed video. We use the Reed Solomon codes in experimental work 
based on some existing algorithm (section 2.11 and 2.12) and in our novel watermarking 
schemes described in chapters three, four and five.
2.4 Transparency or Imperceptibility Issues
Visible watermarks are visual patterns like logos which are inserted into images or 
video. The intention is for the presence of the watermark to be very obvious but equally to 
make it impossible to remove without destroying the image. In contrast invisible
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watermarks, which is the main area of research, are imperceptible. In order to improve the 
imperceptibility, the human visual system (HVS) for images or video, are taken into 
account.
Nevertheless, the more imperceptible the watermark, the less robust it is. Thus, in 
designing watermarking methods, there is trade off between the imperceptibility and the 
robustness.
As many applications need the watermark to be robust yet transparent, the 
watermark should be embedded into the host data robustly without destroying the image 
quality. The most straightforward way to introduce a transparent watermark results in a 
scheme that is very vulnerable to attack. For example, placing a watermark in the least 
significant bits or in the high frequency components can be destroyed with simple 
quantization or low pass filtering without necessary affecting the image quality [87].
A seminal image watermarking method proposed by Cox et al [26], called spread 
spectrum watermarking, showed that the technique is very effective both in term of image 
quality and robustness to signal processing and other attempts to remove the watermark. 
One of the significant contributions in this work is the realization that the watermark 
should be inserted in the perceptually significant portion of the image to be robust. A DCT 
is performed on the whole image, and the watermark is inserted in a pre-determined range 
of low frequency components minus the DC component.
Nevertheless, since the watermark is inserted into the coefficients of the global 
transform, the watermark may affect any pixel of the image. Based on this fact, several 
more recent methods [87,97,51,59] proposed an adaptive watermarking by using the 
knowledge of human visual system (HVS). The watermark should be embedded in the 
parts where the HVS is less sensitive by using masking. It should be noted, however, that 
by embedding the watermark in the least perceptually significant parts, the robustness 
might be reduced. An attacker may remove the watermark by processing these particular 
parts without impairing the image quality too much. Thus, there is a trade off between the 
robustness and imperceptibility.
Regarding the HVS masking, the visibility of the embedded watermark is affected 
by the luminance and the texture of the background in the following ways [52]:
• The brighter the background, the lower the visibility of the embedded signal 
(luminance masking)
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• The stronger the texture in the background, the lower the visibility of the 
embedded signal (texture masking)
Those approaches can be applied adaptively to the image in various techniques. For 
watermarking in the DCT domain, a blocked DCT (e.g. 8x8) is used instead of a global 
DCT. Then the image dependent niasking threshold is used to determine the location (i.e. 
which block) and the maximum strength of the watermark embedding.
For DWT watermarking, these approaches benefit from the wavelet decomposition 
characteristic. The watermark can be embedded into transform components that have 
spatially local or spatially global effects. The watermark component with local spatial 
support is suited for local visual masking effects and is robust to signal processing such as 
cropping. The watermark component with global spatial support is robust to operations 
such as low-pass filtering [87].
Evaluating the perceptibility of the watermarks can be done either through 
subjective tests or quality .metric [58]. When using a subjective test, a testing protocol has 
to be followed, describing the testing and evaluating procedure. One of the methods is the 
ITU-R BT.500 recommendation, and this will be explained in more detail in chapter five.
In such an environment, quantitative distortion metrics are much more efficient and 
allow fair comparison between different methods as the results do not depend on 
subjective evaluations [58]. The most popular distortion measures in the field of image and 
video coding and compression are the peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) which is 
measured in decibels (dB). Assume we are given a source image fi j)  that contains N  by N  
pixels and a watermarked image and is the largest possible value of  the PSNR 
is defined as [77]:
PSNR = 20 log
It should be noted however, that this distortion metric is not very well correlated 
with the human visual system [58], thus it should be applied carefully, particularly in 
moving pictures. This issue will be addressed in more detail in chapter five in relation to 
our proposed video watermarking.
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2.5 Attacks against Watermarking
The existence of watermarking technology and its potential possibilities have 
stimulated individuals to come up with attempts to defeat watermarking. Thus 
watermarking schemes should be robust against these intentional attacks as well as any 
unintentional attacks such as common signal processing.
Hartung et al [45] distinguished attacks against watermarking into four categories. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the transitions between classes are sometimes vague, 
and that some attacks do not clearly belong to one group.
The first group is called simple attacks. These attacks, which are also called 
waveform attacks or noise attacks, attempt to impair the embedded watermark by 
manipulating the whole host data plus watermark. These include addition of noise, 
filtering, waveform-based compression, addition of offset, cropping, quantization in pixel 
domain, conversion to analog, and gamma correction for compensating the non-linearity of 
the light intensity produced by scanner, printer, or monitor.
The second category is detection-disabling attacks. These attacks or so called 
synchronization attacks attempt to break the correlation and to make the recovery of the 
watermark infeasible for a watermark detector. Examples include geometric distortion 
such as zooming, shifting, rotation, shearing, cropping, pixel permutations, sub-sampling, 
removal or insertion of pixels.
The next group is ambiguity attacks. Other possible names of these attacks are 
confusion attacks, deadlock attacks, inversion attacks, fake-watermark attacks, or fake- 
original attacks. These attempt to confuse by producing fake original or fake watermarked 
data.
The last category is removal attacks. These attacks attempt to analyse the 
watermark data, estimate the watermark or the host data, separate the watermarked data 
irito host data and watermark, and discard only the watermark. Examples are collusion 
attacks, denoising, non-linear filtering, or compression using synthetic modelling of the 
image, and also the attacks that are tailored to a specific watermarking scheme.
There are several publicly available tools to test the robustness of image 
watermarking techniques. The Unzign is a utility that works for images in JPEG format. In 
the first version it introduces pixel jittering in combination with a slight image translation.
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The tool seems to efficiently remove or destroy embedded watermark. However, besides 
removing the watermark, it often introduces unacceptable artefacts [58].
Frequency Mode Laplacian Removal (FMLR), which was created by Barnet and 
Pearson [16] is another malicious attack operator. This attack uses Laplacian 3x3 
convolutional mask in conjunction with DCT to 8x8 pixels block to remove the 
watermark. It was reported that this attack is effective against several watermarking 
schemes such as spread spectrum global DCT [26], and 8x8 DCT block-based scheme 
similar to a commercially available scheme.
StirMark [81,82], as has been mentioned in the first chapter, is another tool to test 
the robustness of image watermarking techniques. In the geometric attack, the image is 
slightly stretched, sheared, shifted and / or rotated by an unnoticeable random amount and 
then a slight deviation, which is greatest at the centre of the image, is applied to each pixel.
a. Original Image b. StirMarked Image
Figure 2-3: Effect Of Stirmark Random Geometric Attack
These distortions do not remove the watermark per se, however, they prevent the 
detector from finding it. As can be seen in Figure 2-3 (a) and (b) applying the StirMark 
random geometric and bending only once introduces a practically unnoticeable quality loss 
in the image.
This attack in conjunction with a variety of attacks including FMLR have been 
bundled in a single package, and it seems that currently this is a de facto benchmarking
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tools in the watermarking research community. Some other common attacks in image 
watermarking are illustrated in Figure 2-4.
a. Shearing
V -
c. Sharpening
. ' '
e. Low JPEG compression
b. Cropping
d. Rotation
f. Scaling
Figure 2-4: Other Examples Of Attacks
One of the common attacks in image watermarking is geometric distortion, such as 
scaling or rotation. Unlike the StirMark which changes the orientation locally, these
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attacks affect the image globally. The changing of image size or its orientation, even by a 
slight amount, can reduce the ability of watermark detection. This is similar to losing 
synchronization in communication systems.
This problem can be solved by detecting the amount of disorientation, then apply the 
inverse rotation to the image prior to the watermark detection. Similarly, for scaling 
attacks the image should be de-scaled prior to the detection.
One method to estimate the degree of rotation or scaling is mentioned in [49], a 
patented method by Kodak. In this method, an invisible template is embedded in the 
image. Then, an auto correlation is applied to the rotated or scaled image. The rotation or 
scale of the image can be deduced by locating the auto correlation peaks. Examples of the 
image and its template auto correlation are shown in the Figure 2-5(a) (not rotated nor 
scaled) and 2-5(b) (rotated and scaled) respectively.
•  •
#  #
#  #
(a) Un-attacked
(b) Rotated and Scaled 
Figure 2-5: Auto Correlation Of Template Embedded In Image
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Another way to deal with synchronization, or in this case to avoid the need for 
synchronization, is based on invariant domain watermarking. The invariant domains are 
domains that are invariant to a certain kind of geometrical transformation. One of them is 
the modulus of the Fourier transformation. This domain is invariant to translations in the 
spatial domain. That is, if the image is shifted, the coefficients of the modulus 
representation in the frequency domain do not change and are therefore invariant to 
translations. To design a system invariant to shifting, the watermark is embedded by 
modifying the absolute values of the frequency coefficients [71].
For robustness to rotation and scaling a combination between the modulus of the 
frequency of the frequency transformation and log-polar maps (Fourier-Mellin transform) 
can be used. To achieve robustness against aspect ratio changing, log-log maps can be 
employed instead of log-polar maps. From this illustration, it can be seen that the domain 
selection is depend on the robustness (or attack type) requirement. Ideally, the 
watermarking system should be robust to any transformation and even local (e.g. StirMark 
random geometric attack) and global warping. Nevertheless, currently there are no 
appropriate domains known that are invariant to such kinds of transformations [71].
2.6 Watermark Detection Types
Regarding the need of the original image, there are two approaches in detecting the 
watermark [44]. First, is a method which needs the original image. This method is also 
called private, non-blind, or non-oblivious watermarking. Watermark recovery is more 
robust if the original, un-watermarked data are available. Furthermore, availability of the 
original data set in the recovery process allows the detection and inversion of distortions 
which change the data geometry. This helps, for example, if a watermarked image has 
been rotated by an attacker.
The second approach is a scheme which does not need the original image. This 
method is also called blind or oblivious watermarking. This is useful if access to the 
original data is not possible.
An example of an oblivious watermarking scheme will be elaborated in section 2.13, 
whereas our new blind detection method will be given in chapter four section 4.9.
Concerning the output forms of the detection [83,44], two different types of 
watermarking systems can be found. These are whether the systems embed arbitrary
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information into the host data or embed specific information or pattern and check the 
existence of the known information later on in the watermark recovery.
The first type, also called as type I  watermarking [83], embedding of arbitrary 
information is, for example, useful for image tracking or video distribution, where the 
serial number of the receiver has to be embedded [44]. The output of the extraction is 
either the payload or symbol saying there is no watermark.
The second type, also called as type II, verification of presence of a known 
watermark, is sufficient for most copyright-protection applications. Type II extraction 
functions only return a present/non present output.
Although most methods are designed for either watermark extraction or verification 
of presence for a given watermark, it should be noted that in fact both approaches are 
inherently equivalent. A scheme that allows watermark verification can be considered as a 
1-bit watermark recovery scheme, which can easily be extended to any number of bits by 
embedding several consecutive 1-bit watermarks’. The inverse is also true, a watermark 
recovery scheme can be considered as a watermark verification scheme assuming the 
embedded information is known [44].
2.7 False Detection Probability and Detection Threshold Setting
In the watermarking detection, the presence (or absence) of the extracted watermark 
is established by comparing the detection measure to a pre-set threshold which is depend 
on the false detection probability.
The following threshold selection procedure is summarized from [75] which 
provides a concise tutorial on the subject of watermark detection. Figure 2-6 shows a basic 
design for a watermark detector.
The input media is first processed by a watermark extractor which generates an n- 
dimensional extracted vector 'V. The extracted vector is then compared against n- 
dimensional watermark vector W, to obtain a detection measure C. Finally, the detection 
measure is compared against a threshold T, and the result of this comparison determines 
whether the detector reports that the watermark is present or not. Generally, larger C 
indicates greater probability that the watermark is present, so the detector reports a 
detection if C>T.
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One of the formulas for computing the detection measure is the ‘normalized 
correlation’, which is defined as:
=
w .v
■ ^çw .w w .V )
( 2-12)
There are at least three methods of computing probability of false detections, these 
are: approximate Gaussian method, Fisher Z-statistic method, and a new method which is 
proposed by Miller et al [75]. Since the prediction value of the latter method is in between 
the prediction value of the first and the second methods, and for a long watermark vector 
(e.g. 1000) there is not much difference in the prediction value, only the first two methods 
will be described in this section.
Input Media
Watermark Vector
n dimensional 
vector
n dimensional 
vector
scalar value
Threshold
Watermark
Extractor
Detection
Value
Calculator
Decision
Figure 2-6: Basic Design For A Watermark Detector
The simplest method, the approximate Gaussian method, calculates the false 
detection probability as:
Pfd ~ ^Kfc{T4n) = ?  ^ dx
rV7v2;r
(2-13)
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This approach treats the distribution of normalized correlation as a Gaussian with 
standard deviation 1/Vn . For relatively low threshold, and relatively high false detection 
probabilities, this approximation can be quite accurate. However, as the threshold increases 
out into the tail of distribution, the probability of false detection is overestimated [75], and 
a more accurate approximation uses the Fisher Z-statistic to estimate the false detection 
probability;
where:
Tz = - l o g i ^  
2 l - T
(2-14)
(2-15)
From equation (2-13) and (2-14), it can be seen that with a selected value of the 
threshold T, the longer the watermark vector length n, the lower the probability of false 
detection. For example, if 7=0.2 and n=100, the probability of false detection is around 
4.7x10’^  (using approximate Gaussian approach), or 4.5x10*  ^(by Fisher Z-statistic).
approx. Gaussian 
Fisher Z-stat.
co
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Threshold on normalized correlation
Figure 2-7: False Detection Rates, Various Threshold, Vector Length 1000
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For threshold T  equal to 0.2 and watermark vector length n equals 1000, the probability of 
detecting a watermark from any un-watermarked host data is between 3.74x10*^  ^ (by 
approximate Gaussian) to 1.33x10*'^ (calculated using Fisher Z-statistic). This threshold is 
quite small and has been selected by several schemes [26,17] when using watermark length 
72=1000. An illustration of false detection rates for various thresholds with watermark 
vector length 1000 is shown in Figure 2-7.
2.8 Watermarking and Encryption
In many applications, digital watermarking can be applied in conjunction with 
encryption for authentication or confidentiality protection. Wong [106] proposed a public 
key watermark for image verification and authentication. This watermark is capable of 
detecting any change made to an image, including changes in pixel values and image size. 
The security of this method resides in a user key used in conjunction with a cryptographic 
hash function.
Wu et al [109] and Amomraksa et al [11], studied both the confidentiality and 
copyright protection for MPEG video by utilizing encryption and watermarking 
respectively. Thus, their schemes meet the security requirements where an outsider should 
not be able to view the video, and an insider (i.e. one of the clients) should be discouraged 
from redistributing the video stream he receives.
Another example is a secure digital video application, which is patented by Barnet 
[17]. By carrying cryptographically secure in-band information with video in the form of a 
digital watermark, secure video can be transmitted and stored without no need for out of 
band secret keys.
One of the problems in image or video encryption is the scale of processing time if 
whole data are processed. Thus, a selective encryption might be chosen [90]. Our efficient 
method for encrypting images is presented in chapter six. It is also shown that this method 
can be utilized in conjunction with image watermarking scheme.
It can be noticed that a general overview of digital watermarking has been given in 
the first eight sections of this chapter. The following sections will give some more specific 
and detailed explanation. Furthermore the experimental results based on these methods 
will be provided.
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2.9 Spread Spectrum Watermarking For Image in DCT Domain
The idea of spread spectrum watermarking was first introduced by Cox et al [26]. 
In this method, the watermark is spread over a set of perceptually important frequency 
components of the data. When an attacker tries to remove the watermark, he has to deal 
with these perceptual components, which in turn can degrade the image fidelity. On the 
other hand, the images may be visibly distorted by the watermark embedding itself. So, 
there is a trade off between the robustness and the invisibility.
This spread spectrum algorithm can be carried out in Fourier Transform, Discrete 
Cosine Transform, or Discrete Wavelet Transform. Moreover, it can be applied to the still 
image, video, and audio.
In this section, an example of spread spectrum image watermarking in DCT 
domain will be explained. Before describing the method in more detail, a brief review of 
the DCT will be given in the following section.
2.9.1 A Brief Review of DCT
The two dimensional DCT of an M by N matrix is defined as follows [73]:
p = 0 a  = I « = 0
P [ V2/M, l < p < M - \  9 V 2 / W ,  l < g r <  W - 1
where the values  ^ are called the DCT coefficients of A.
The inverse DCT is given by :
^ 1  ^ 1  n{2m+l)p 7i{2n + l)q 0 < m  < M  - I
^  1/ V m , P = 0 ^  _ f  1/ V Â ,  9 = 0
P [ V2/M, 1 < P < M - 1  9 [ VtTÏV, 1<9<A-1
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The DCT has the property that, for a typical image, most of the visually significant 
information about the image is concentrated in just a few coefficients of the DCT.
2.9 2 Watermark Embedding
The procedure for spread spectrum watermark embedding is illustrated in Figure 2- 
8. Upon applying a frequency transformation to the image, a perceptual mask is computed 
that highlights perceptually significant regions in the spectrum that can support the 
watermark without affecting perceptual fidelity. The watermark signal is then inserted into 
these regions, where the precise magnitude of each modification is kept secret. In practice, 
in order to place a length n watermark into NxN image, thé N xN  DCT of the image is 
computed, and the watermark is placed in the n highest magnitude coefficients of the 
matrix, excluding the DC component, since changing this component may degrade the 
whole image.
A watermark consists of a sequence of real numbers X  = , where each
value is chosen independently according to a normal distribution with mean = 0 and
variance = 1. Cox et al [26] stated that this type of watermark data has better performance 
than uniformly distributed {1,-1}, {0,1} or [0,1] data. However, it is shown from our 
experimental work that by applying an error control code, e.g. Reed Solomon, to binary 
data, comparable robustness against several attacks can be achieved. The details of the 
simulation will be given in section 2-11.
The watermark X  with length n can be inserted into image V  to obtain the 
watermarked image V’, by using the following formula :
v ’. =v . { l  + ccx^) (2-18)
where a  is the scaling factor to control the watermark level which in turn relates to the 
visibility and the robustness of the watermark.
The choice of n dictates the degree to which the watermark is spread out among the 
relevant components of the image. It should be noted that the number of bits of 
information associated with the watermark can be arbitrary. The watermark is simply used 
as an index to a database entry associated with the watermark.
28
Chapter 2. Introduction to Digital Watermarking
ORIGINAL
IMAGE
WATERMARK
DATA
IDCT
DCT
WATERMARKED
IMAGE
Figure 2-8: Frequency Domain Watermarking Embedding
2.9.3 Watermark Extraction
The extraction of the watermark is illustrated in ‘Figure 2-9, where the possibly 
attacked watermarked image, original image, and the watermark data are involved.
POSSIBLY ATTACKED 
WATERMARKED IMAGE
ORIGINAL
IMAGE EXTRACTED
WATERMARK
ORIGINAL SIMILAR
WATERMARK
DCT
DCT
Figure 2-9: Frequency Domain Watermarking Extraction
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The watermark data can be recovered by subtracting the transformed components of the 
possibly attacked image with the transformed components of the original image by using 
the inverse of equation (2-18).
It is highly unlikely that the extracted watermark X* will be the same as the 
original watermark X. Thus, the degree of similarity between X  and X* has to be 
statistically calculated. One of the formulas to measure it is given by [26]:
X * .X5/M (X ,X *) = (2-19)
The maximum value of S I M { X , X *), i.e. S I M { X , X )  can be approximated by
S I M( X , X) - = 4 n
where n equals the length of the watermark.
It should be noted that the formula in equation (2-19) is an un-normalized version of the 
equation (2-12).
Figure 2-10 shows an example of the detector response from un-attacked 
watermarked image. In this case the length n=1000 watermark data is used, and the 
embedded watermark is chosen from a set of 1000 watermarks. It can be seen that the 
positive response due to the correct watermark is very much stronger than the response to 
incorrect watermarks. This indicates that the algorithm has very low false positive 
response rates.
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
Watermark Data Index
Figure 2-10: Watermark Detector Response
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In this algorithm, for watermark length n=1000, detection threshold T = 6 is chosen 
[26]. From equations (2-13) and (2-20), it can be calculated that by choosing this threshold 
value, the probability of false detection around 3.74x10'^^, which is very small, can be 
achieved.
2.10 Digital Watermarking For Images In DWT Domain
An example of DWT watermarking is given by Xia et al [110]. He proposed a 
wavelet transform based watermarking method by adding pseudo-random codes to the 
large coefficients at the high and middle frequency bands of the discrete wavelet transform 
of an image.
The basic idea is similar to Cox et al [26] spread spectrum watermarking. 
However, Xia et al [110] claimed some advantages. The important one is that the human 
eyes are not sensitive to small changes in edges and texture of an image but are very 
sensitive to small changes in the smooth parts of an image. With the DWT, the edges and 
textures are usually well confined to the high frequency sub-bands. Large coefficients in 
these bands usually indicate edges in an image. Therefore, adding watermarks to these 
large coefficients is difficult for the human eye to perceive.
A brief review of the discrete wavelet transform followed by the detailed algorithm 
will be given in the following sections.
2.10.1 A Brief Review of DWT
The basic idea of the one dimensional DWT is as follows [110]. A signal is split 
into two parts, high frequencies and low frequencies. Then, the low frequencies are split 
again into two parts of high and low frequencies. This process can be continued several 
times, which is usually determined by the application. Moreover, from these DWT 
coefficients, the original signal can be reconstructed by inverse DWT (IDWT). The 
transform can be mathematically stated as follows.
Let
(2-21,
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k
be a low pass and a high pass filter respectively. 
A signal x[n] can be decomposed recursively as
C j- l ,k  -  % hn-2k  Cj,n  
n
d  j - l ,k  ~  S n -2 k  ^j,n
(2-22)
(2-23)
(2-24)
for/=  J+1, J, Jo where cj+i^ k = x[k], ke Z, /+ !  is the high resolution level index, and Jo 
is the low resolution level index. The coefficients djo,h djo+i,k, •••, z f a r e  called the 
DWT of signal x[n], where cjo,k is the lowest resolution part of x[n] and d^k are the details 
ofx[n] at various bands of frequencies. This process is illustrated in the Figure 2-11.
X[n],
^  H* ( w )  - > 2  1  >
>  H*(w) > 2 1  ----- ^
H*(w) > 2 1  ------>  cjo
>  G*(w) > 2 1   >  djo
>  G*(w) > 2 1   >  dj.
>  G*(w) - >  2 1 ------ >  dj
Figure 2-11: Decomposition of One Dimensional Signal
Furthermore, the signal x[n] can be reconstructed from its DWT coefficients recursively 
by the following formula.
^ j , n -  ^ h n -2 k C j- l ,k  ^'^Sn-2kdj-\,I< (2-25)
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>  X[n]G(w)
G(w)
H(w)
G(w)
H(w)
H(w)
Figure 2-12: Reconstruction of One Dimensional Signal
To ensure the DWT and IDWT relationship, the orthogonality condition on the filters H(co) 
and G( co) is needed :
(2-26)
An example of the filter is the Haar wavelet filter, where
and
(2-27)
(2-28)
As illustrated in Figure 2-13 for two dimensional images x[m,n], DWT and IDWT 
can be implemented by taking the transform for each dimension separately.
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X[m,n]
►  H * (W )
m  m
►  H *(w) >  2
►  G*(w) >  2
►  G *(w)
m  m
►  H *(w ) >  2
►  G*(w) >  2
Figure 2-13: Decomposition of Two Dimensional Signal
The image decomposition can be represented by a pyramid structure, as shown in 
Figure 2-14, with various band information such as low-low (LL), low-high (LH), high- 
high (HH) etc. frequency bands. This figure provides an example for three levels of 
decomposition.
LL3 HL3
HL2
HL,
LH3 HH3
LHg HHg
LH, HH,
Figure 2-14: DWT Pyramid Decomposition of an Image
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2.10.2 Watermark Insertion
First, an image is decomposed into several bands with a pyramid structure as 
shown in Figure 2-14 and then the watermark is added to the largest coefficients v, 
which are not located in the lowest resolution band [110], using the formula in equation (2- 
18). Then, the two dimensional IDWT is taken to form the watermarked image.
* watermark is not 
added in this region
Watermarked ImageOriginal Image
Watermark
DWT IDWTEMBED
Figure 2-15: Watermark Embedding
2.10.3 Watermark Extraction
To extract the watermark, firstly the possibly attacked watermarked image and the 
original image are decomposed using the DWT, and then the watermark can be obtained 
by calculating xi from the equation (2-18). Denoting the extracted watermark bit x/ by x,*, in 
order to differentiate with the notation of the original watermark, the extracted watermark 
X* is then compared to the original watermark X  by the correlation in equation (2-19).
In the next section several experiments for image watermarking using the spread 
spectrum algorithm will be presented. The performance based on DCT and DWT 
embedding domains will be reviewed.
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2.11 Experiments on Spread Spectrum Watermarking using DCT and 
DWT
The simulations of spread spectrum digital watermarking in DCT and DWT domain 
were carried out by using the MATLAB Communication Toolbox [103], Image Processing 
Toolbox [73] and Wavelet Toolbox [76]. Then, several attacks were tested against the 
watermarked image. The attacks, include adding Gaussian noise, low JPEG compression, 
rotation, collusion, scaling, and cropping, were implemented by using MATLAB, whereas 
other attacks such as Frequency Mode Laplacian Removal (FMLR), 2x2 Median Filter, 
and StirMark random geometric and bending were applied by using StirMark version 3.1 
software [81,82]. The block diagram of the simulation is shown in Figure 2-16.
ORIGINAL IMAGE
WATERMARK DATA 1
WATERMARK DATA 2
WATERMARK DATA /t
WATERMARK DATA n
V. = V,. (1 + a  w. )
WATERMARK
EMBEDDING
W,.
W
c/3
T.
A SET OF WATERMARK DATA
ATTACKS
WATERMARKED
IMAGE
W ’ 
<—
D ET EC TO R  R E S P O N S E
WATERMARK
EXTRACTION
Figure 2-16 : Watermarking Simulation
For the watermark, a set of 1000 orthogonal watermark data with 1000 values in 
each is chosen from a group of random number. For real data, the watermark is chosen 
from a group of number created using a random generator with normal distribution with 
mean zero and variance one. For binary data {-1,1}, the watermark is chosen from a group 
of number created using a uniform distribution with mean zero and variance one. The
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orthogonality between the chosen watermark data with the others are tested by calculating 
their similarity using equation (2-19).
Firstly, the test image 512x512 pixels Lena was watermarked by using DCT and 
DWT domain algorithm for both real and binary data in conjunction with (255,125) Reed 
Solomon codes. In the embedding, the equation (2-18) is used for both the real and binary 
{-1,1} RS encoded data. For DWT domain, 3 levels of decomposition in association with 
the Haar wavelet filter was applied. The original image and the watermarked images (with 
real number data) for various embedding levels a  , are shown in Figures 2-17 to 2-22.
The effect of using strong embedding level, using a  =0.5 in both DCT domain and 
DWT domain is shown in Figures 2-17 and 2-18 respectively. It can be noted from those 
pictures that in DCT domain the strong embedding degraded the picture severely, whereas 
in DWT domain only the edges of the image are highly affected. In other words, in terms 
of imperceptibility, the watemiarking in the DWT domain has better performance.
In order to make fair comparison, the parameter in both algorithms must be chosen 
such that the produced watermark images give equal quality. One common method to 
measure the quality is PSNR as stated in equation (2-11). PSNR = 37 dB can be achieved by 
setting the a  =0.10 and «=0.36 for watermarking in the DCT and DWT domain 
respectively. However, as PSNR is not very well correlated with the human visual system 
[58], the results should be checked carefully. It can be seen from Figure 2-21, watermarked 
image in DWT domain, that some perceptible artefacts (e.g. in the lips, shoulder, and left 
eye) are found. So, the embedding strength was reduced until the visual quality of the 
watermarked images was approximately equal. It was found that with «  =0.15 for the 
DWT domain, the watermarked image has approximately equal visual quality to the DCT 
embedded watermark with «  =0.1. These values were also used by the authors of 
[26,110].
Next, the detection robustness performance was investigated. In this experiments, 
«  =0.1 and «  =0.15 for watermarking in DCT and DWT domain respectively were used. 
First, without applying any attack, the watermarks were extracted from the images and all 
of the embedded watermarks can be detected. It is shown in Figure 2-23 and 2-24 for the 
DCT and DWT domain respectively, that the embedded watermark number 500 can be 
detected and clearly distinguished. Then, the robustness against various attacks were 
tested.
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Figure 2-17: Watermarked Image in DCT 
domain, C t = 0.5, PSNR: 23.37 dB
Figure 2-18: Watermarked Image in DWT 
domain, (X = 0.5, PSNR: 34.69 dB
Figure 2-19: Original Image Figure 2-20: Watermarked Image in DCT 
domain, (X  =  0.1, PSNR: 37.28 dB
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Figure 2-21: Watermarked Image in DWT 
domain, CC = 0.36, PSNR: 37.42 dB
Figure 2-22: Watermarked Image in DWT 
domain, (X  = 0.15, PSNR: 44.85 dB
"0 200 400 600 800 1000
W atermark Data Index
Figure 2*23: Watermark Detection for DCT 
domain, CX = 0.1
200 400 600 • 800
W aterm ark Data Index
1000
Figure 2-24: Watermark Detection for DWT 
domain, (X  = 0.15
Several attacks were applied to the watermarked images with those selected 
embedding strengths, and the results are summarized in Table 2-1. For the Gaussian noise, 
low JPEG compression, rotation, and scaling, the results indicate the maximum level of 
attack where the watermark still can be detected. The embedded watermark is categorized 
as successfully detected if its SIM is above the pre-set threshold (i.e. 6). For watermark 
length 1000 and threshold 6, from equation (2-20) and (2-13), the false detection probability 
of 3.74x10'^^ is obtained.
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Table 2-1: DWT and DCT Watermarking Robustness Test Results
Attacks DWT DCT
Real Bin + RS Real Bin + RS
Gaussian Noise Var < 0.14 Var < 0.025 Var < 0.1 Var < 0.048
Low Bitrate JPEG Compression QF> 1 OF > 5 QF> 1 OF > 5
Rotation : - detect directly Offset < 0.4" Offset < 0.5" a fs e t< 0 .l" Offset < 0.4"
- re-rotate 71X90" ±15" 71X90" ±15" Any angle Any angle
Scaling SF > 0.42 SF > 0.8 SF > 0.25 SF > 0.25
FMLR Ok OK OK OK
2X2 Median Filter OK OK OK OK
Cropping Cropped<95% Cropped<90% Cropped<95% Cropped<70%
Stir Mark Rand. Geometric . Fail Fail Fail Fail
The first experiment was by adding Gaussian noise, where the mean was set to zero 
and the variance was adjusted. The most robust is the DWT with the real data, where it can 
cope with variance < 0.14. With this noise level, the image is highly distorted. Thus, there 
is no point for the attacker removing the watermark by this method since the image is 
destroyed.
For the low compression attack, both algorithms are robust enough where for low 
quality factor, the detection still works well.
Regarding the rotation attack, the experiment was carried out in two approaches. 
Firstly, the watermarked image was slightly rotated, then watermark extraction was 
attempted directly. Secondly, after rotation, the image was re-rotated by the same angle 
with the opposite direction. This second method has been done by several authors to test 
their algorithm, for instance in [85] when comparing several watermarking techniques. 
From the results, it can be seen that if the rotation angle is known exactly, the DCT is the 
best method against the attack. However, since it is not possible to inverse the rotation 
precisely, the DWT method gives better results as it can cope with 0.5° offset.
This rotation attack was carried out by applying the ‘imrotate’ function in Matlab. This 
function uses two-dimensional interpolation when it estimates an image value at a location 
in between image pixels [73]. This interpolation and the fact that the DWT watermarking 
affects mainly the image edges, may cause the detection of the watermarking in the DWT 
failed when the image was rotated and re-rotated by more than 15°.
To test the robustness against scaling, the watermarked image was scaled by y , then 
rescaled by factor 1/y , and finally the extraction was executed. For y <1, the image can 
be scaled down to 0.42, 0.8, and 0.25 times for DWT with real data, DWT with binary data
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and DCT domain respectively. This limitation maybe due to the interpolation to estimate 
the pixel values that was carried out when the image was scaled up. However, for any 
y >1, the watermark can be detected easily without any degradation, even for large scaling 
number.
Another attack was FMLR, which was created by Barnet and Pearson [16], where 
Laplacian 3x3 convolutional mask in conjunction with DCT to 8x8 pixels block is used. 
The algorithms are robust against this attack.
For low pass filtering using 2x2 median filter, which is also included in StirMark 3.1 
package, the watermark can be successfully detected.
To test the robustness against cropping, the watermarked image was cropped, then the 
missing portions of the image were replaced with portions from the original image which 
does not contain the watermark, before detection [26]. It can be seen that for real data with 
DWT or DCT the image can be cropped up to 95%, whereas for binary data it can be 
cropped up to 90% and 70% for DWT and DCT domain respectively.
Finally, the StirMark Random Geometric and Bending was applied [81,82]. In this 
attack, the image is slightly stretched, sheared, shifted and / or rotated by an unnoticeable 
random amount, then followed by bending where slight deviation is applied to each pixel. 
Although the attack is unnoticeable, it is very effective and the watermark can not be 
extracted.
2.12 Watermarking with Complementary Modulation
By studying the effect of attacks on watermarking method suggested by Cox et al 
[26] and Podilchuk et al [87], Lu et al [66,67,68] observed that an arbitrary attack either 
decreases or increases the magnitude of the majority (>50%) of the transformed 
coefficients. For instances, sharpening like attacks will increase most of the transformed 
coefficients of the watermarked image, whereas a blurring attack causes most of the 
transformed coefficients to decrease in magnitude. In other words, the chance that an 
attack will make the number of increased and of decreased coefficients equal is very low. 
Thus, based on these facts, they proposed an efficient modulation strategy, which is 
composed of a positive modulation (increasing the magnitude of transformed coefficients) 
and a negative modulation (decreasing the magnitude of transformed coefficients). The
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two modulations simultaneously hide a watermark in two complementary forms in a host 
image, so that at least one watermark survives under different attacks.
In this scheme, the watermark is embedded in the DWT coefficients. The wavelet 
coefficients of the host image are sorted in increasing order. Each watermark bit is 
embedded twice using positive and negative modulation. This method is as follows.
First, consider if the watermark has positive value. The positive modulation is 
performed by adding the mark to the positive coefficient, and we start to embed from the
positive coefficient which has the highest amplitude. Then, for the same positive
watermark, negative modulation is performed by adding the (positive) mark to the negative 
coefficient, and we start to embed from the negative coefficient which has the highest 
amplitude.
Now consider if the watermark has negative value. The positive modulation is 
obtained by adding the mark to the negative coefficient, and we start to embed from the 
negative coefficient which has the highest amplitude. Then, for the same negative
watermark, negative modulation is carried out by adding the (negative) mark to the
positive coefficient, and we start to embed from the positive coefficient which has the 
highest amplitude.
The subsequent bits of the watermark are processed using the same methods and 
embedded to the next coefficients which have not been modulated.
In our experimental work, two different methods i.e. single modulation [110] and 
complementary modulation [66,67,68] are compared. The embedding and detection 
methods according to equations (2-18) and (2-19) respectively were employed. The random 
binary data with (248,124) Reed Solomon code was used as a watermark and the results 
are shown in Table 2-2 and Figure 2-25. As can be seen from Table 2-2, the 
complementary modulation scheme is more robust for these attacks: rotation and scaling, 
whereas for Gaussian noise, low JPEG compression and cropping this scheme is less 
robust. In addition, both methods are not robust against StirMark random geometric attack. 
Figure 2-25 shows the SIM of these two methods against various other attacks. The 
complementary modulation method is more robust for those attacks, i.e. FMLR, median 
filter, sharpening, linear filtering, and several cases of aspect ratio changing and column 
removal.
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Figure Figure 2-25: Single and Complementary Modulation Robustness Against Various Attacks
Table 2-2: Single and Complementary Modulation Robustness
Attacks XIa method Lu method
Gaussian Noise, mean=0 Var < 0.025 Var < 0.012
Low JPEG Compression Q F > 5 OF > 9
Rotation : - detect directly Offset <0.5° Offset <0.5°
- re-rotate nx90°±15° Any angle
Scaling SF > 0.8 SF > 0.4
Cropping Cropped < 90% Cropped < 85%
StirMark Rand.Geometric Fail Fail
2.13 Oblivious / Blind Detection Watermarking
By making the image watermarking system oblivious, the original un-watermarked 
image is not needed in the detection, so that it can be kept , secret. An example of this 
method is proposed by Piva et al [86] where an oblivious / blind detection method is 
obtained by using the correlation of the marked coefficients and the watermarks. The brief 
description of their method is as follows.
43
Chapter 2. Introduction to Digital Watermarking
The watermark consists of a pseudo-random sequence of M  real numbers 
X  = and each value being a random number having a standard normal
distribution.
In the embedding, the NxN  DCT of an NxN  image 1 is computed, then the DCT 
coefficients are re-ordered into a zig-zag scan, such as in the JPEG compression algorithm, 
and the first L+M coefficients are selected to generate a vector 
r  Then, in order to obtain a trade off between perceptual
invisibility and robustness, the lowest L coefficients are skipped and a watermark 
X  chosen amongst 1000 pseudorandom sequences, is embedded in the
lastMnumbers to obtain anew vector } according to:
t  L + i  ~  ^ L + i  ^ L + i \ ^ i  ( 2-29)
where 7=1,...,M. The inverse DCT is then performed obtaining the watermarked image V.
In the detection, given a possibly corrupted image /*, the NyN  DCT is applied to 
/*, then the DCT coefficients are re-ordered into a zigzag scan, and the coefficients from 
the (L+1)^  ^ to the are selected to generate a vector T* }• The
presence of the watermark is measured by calculating the correlation z between the DCT 
coefficients marked with a codemark X  and a possibly different mark Y by using:
Y  y* 1 M1 1
The correlation z is then compared to the threshold which is evaluated directly on the 
marked image:
( 2-31)
and the mark is considered to be present if z > .
Piva et al [86] suggested using random real numbers with length 16000 as a 
watermark. To investigate the output of the detection and the possibility of using a shorter 
watermark, several experiments were conducted. A set of 100 random watermarks with 
maximum length 20000 each were provided. One of them was embedded in the Lena 
image with embedding strength G: =0.2, as suggested in [86]. Then, the detection by using
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a method as suggested in the equation (2-30) was performed. The detection results of the 
un-attacked image for various watermark length are shown in Figure 2-26.
It can be seen from those figures that the longer the watermark length, the bigger the 
difference between the SIM of the correct watermark and the incorrect watermarks. Or, in 
other words, shorter watermark length produces higher false positive response rates.
Comparing this oblivious detection result with the non-oblivious method [26] as 
shown in Figure 2-10, in terms of the detection output, it is obvious that the method which 
needs the original image has better performance.
Another drawback of this method is that this method requires longer watermark data 
to embed. However, by using our approach as described in chapter four section 4.9, a 
shorter watermark length can be applied.
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Figure 2-26: Oblivious Detection Results, Various Watermark Length
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2.14 Conclusions
From the explanations in section 2.2 to 2.13, it can be seen that several important 
issues, such as robustness, imperceptibility and attacks, related to digital watermarking 
have been introduced. In addition, some examples of current watermarking schemes as 
well as their performance evaluation based on our experimental work are also presented. It 
is observed that those schemes are not robust against the StirMark random geometric 
attack.
One of those schemes, i.e. watermarking with complementary modulation, will be 
improved and this will be explained in the next chapter. In addition a new method for 
combating random geometric attack will be presented.
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Chapter 3
3 Image Watermarking Robustness 
Improvement and StirMark Disabling 
Method
3.1 Introduction
From the previous chapter, it can be observed that both transparency and robustness 
are required for robust watermarking. Many existing watermarking schemes, including 
DCT and DWT watermarking explained in sections 2.9 to 2.12 are not robust against 
StirMark random geometric attack [81,82]. In this chapter, an improvement of an existing 
scheme and a method for disabling the random geometric attack will be proposed. In 
addition, comments on an existing method to combat StirMark will be presented.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 will describe an 
enhancement of an existing scheme in DWT domain, namely watermarking using 
complementary modulation by Lu et al [66,67,68]. Then, comments on an existing method 
to combat StirMark random geometric attack by coefficient relocation will be presented in 
section 3.3. As there is a weakness in this method, another method is proposed in section 
3.4. This new method to resist the StirMark random geometric attack employs a pixel 
replacement strategy. The above schemes have been published and can be found in [1,2].
3.2 Improvement on Watermarking using Complementary Modulation
As described in the previous chapter section 2.3, the robustness of watermarking 
systems can be improved by applying diversity or by using an error correction code if the 
watermark is binary. One diversity method is proposed by Lu et al [66,67,68]; this 
embedded the watermark data by using complementary modulation i.e. positive and
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negative modulations. In this section we suggest an enhancement of the method in 
[66,67,68] if binary data is applied as a wateimark.
3.2.1 Complementary Modulation
In order to be robust against attacks, many watermarking schemes such as [26,110] 
embed the watermark by slightly changing or modulating the magnitude of the 
perceptually significant transform coefficients. If the watermark has positive value, the 
coefficient magnitude is increased. Conversely, if the watermark has negative value (or 0 
or -1 for binary type) the magnitude is decreased.
As described in section 2.12, Lu et al [66,67,68] observed that an arbitrary attack 
usually tends to increase or decrease the magnitudes of the majority of the transformed 
coefficients. In other words, the chance that an attack will make the number of increased 
and of decreased coefficients equal is very low. They proposed a scheme which aims to 
detect the watermark from the less distorted coefficients. They use two different 
modulation rules: positive modulation and negative modulation. If a modulation operates 
by adding a positive quantity to a positive coefficient or by adding a negative quantity to a 
negative coefficient, then it is called positive modulation. On the contrary, if a modulation 
operates by adding a negative quantity to a positive coefficient or by adding a positive 
quantity to a negative coefficient, it is called negative modulation. Then, in the detection, 
the best result that survives against attacks is chosen.
3.2.2 Reed Solomon Codes Overview
Digital watermarking embedding and,, detection can be observed as a 
communication system where the information (i.e. the watermark) is transmitted through a 
channel to the receiver. To overcome the errors which may occur in the channel (i.e. the 
attacks), an error control code can be utilized. In our proposed scheme, a Reed Solomon 
(RS) code is used. A brief summary of RS codes and their terminology will be given as 
follows.
A Reed Solomon code [70,98,50,111] is usually specified as RS(«,Â:), where k data 
symbols have appended {n-k) parity symbols to make an n-symbol codeword. The code 
rate is equal to kJn. The RS code decoder can correct errors and erasures. If the position of 
the incorrect symbol is known, it can be categorized as an erasure. The RS code is
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maximum distance separable (MDS) and it can corrects up to t=n-k symbol erasures. So, 
an RS decoder can correct up to e={n-k)l2 symbol errors or, up to t=n-k symbol erasures or, 
any combination of errors and erasures as long as 2e+t<n-k. To fit the specific 
implementation, RS codes can be shortened by making several data symbols zero at the 
encoder, not transmitting them, and inserting them in the detection prior to the decoding. 
Figure 3-1 shows a typical Reed-Solomon codeword. This is known as a systematic code 
because the data is left unchanged and the parity symbols are appended.
r - k n-k
Data Parity
Figure 3-1: Typical RS Codeword
3.2.3 Embedding and Detection Scheme
From section 3.2.1, it can be observed that in the complementary modulation 
scheme, higher robustness can be obtained either from the positive or negative modulation. 
Then, from section 3.2.2 it is discussed that error control coding can help to combat errors 
or erasures. Thus, intuitively, an improvement can be expected if thé correct combination 
of both approaches is applied. This can be achieved by using a Reed Solomon code on the 
watermark, then embedding data and parity separately in negative and positive modulation 
respectively onto the discrete wavelet transform coefficients.
A block diagram of improved complementary modulation watermarking is shown 
in Figure 3-2. Firstly, the original image is decomposed into three levels using the discrete 
wavelet transform. Like the method of Xia et al [110], the watermark will be embedded 
only in the largest coefficients at the high and middle frequency bands. The DWT 
coefficients at the lowest resolution are not changed. By doing so, the global part of the 
image will not be altered, to ensure the imperceptibility.
For the watermark, k symbols (or ks bits, if each symbol consists of 5 bits) of 
random {0,1} binary data are used, and they are encoded by a Reed Solomon error 
correcting code into n symbols (or ns bits), before being embedded into the required DWT 
coefficients.
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Watermarked
ImageOriginalImage
Data Parity
Watermark
Data
DWT IDWT
RS Encoder
Positive
Modulation
Negative
Modulation
Figure 3-2: Enhanced Complementary Modulation Embedding
Next, the high and mid band coefficients of the host image (V) are sorted in increasing 
order and the odd and even coefficients are marked. Then, the positive and negative 
modulations are applied to the parity and data (W) respectively, constructing watermarked 
coefficients (V'), using the following rules:
Parity /  Positive Modulation:
y -_ |v , ( l + C!r), w = 0, i ’.o d d
+ w = l, i- .odd
( 3-1)
Data / Negative Modulation:
V.- =
V, (1 - a ) ,  w  =  0, i = even
Vmax-,(1-<3T), w = l, i =  even
(3-2)
First, consider the parity bits only. The parity are embedded into the odd 
coefficients by using positive modulation, i.e. increasing the coefficient amplitude. If the 
parity bit is equal to zero, we increase the magnitude of the negative coefficient, starting 
from the negative coefficient which has highest amplitude (v;). If the parity bit is equal to 
one, we increase the magnitude of the positive coefficient, starting from the positive 
coefficient which has the highest amplitude {vmax-i)- The subsequent parity bits are 
embedded with the same approach into the next odd coefficients.
Then, consider the data bits only. The data bits are embedded into the even 
coefficients by using negative modulation, i.e. decreasing the coefficient amplitude. If the 
data is equal to zero, we decrease the magnitude of the negative coefficient, starting from 
the negative coefficient which has the highest amplitude (V2). If the data bit is equal to one, 
we decrease the magnitude of the positive coefficient, starting from the positive coefficient
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which has the highest amplitude {vmax-i)^  The subsequent data bits are embedded with the 
same method into the next even coefficients.
Finally, after the coefficients are set to their original order, they are reconstructed 
by inverse discrete wavelet transform to form the watermarked image. The scaling factor 
a  is used to adjust the watermark level, so that it is imperceptible.
ParitySuspect
Image
Data
Original
Image
Watermark
SIM
SIM
» SIM
DWT
DWT
Select
Best
RS Decoder
RS Decoder 
+ Erasure-2
RS Decoder 
+ Erasure-1
Positive
Demodulation
Negative
Demodulation
Data
Figure 3-3; Enhanced Complementary Modulation Detection
The watermark detection is performed by the scheme shown in Figure 3-3 using the 
original image. First, both the suspect and the original image are transformed by DWT. 
Then positive and negative demodulation are processed by using the inverse of equations 
(3-1) and (3-2) respectively. Next, the extracted data and parity are fed to three different RS 
decoding scenarios. The first decoder is without erasure, whereas two others are using 
erasures. Finally, after comparing the decoded watermark W* with the original watermark 
data W  using a similarity correlation suggested by Cox et al [26] in equation (2-19), the best 
similarity value is chosen. The detection threshold T can be set by using the equation (2-13) 
or (2-14) for the required false detection probability P/d.
In the experiment, a set of m randomly generated watermarks with ks bits each is 
used to check that the detection best matches the original watermark.
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3.2.4 Experimental Results
To evaluate the performance of the proposed watermarking scheme, the 512x512 
Lena image was used as a host image. The simulation was conducted mainly by using 
Matlab where the parameters were set as follows. A set of m=1000 {0,1} random binary 
data with length ks=992 bits each, were provided. Then, one series was selected and used 
as a watermark in conjunction with an RS code. The image decomposition and 
reconstruction was carried out by discrete wavelet transform with Haar filter. The 
watermark level a  was experimentally set to 0.15. The larger the value of a , the more the 
watermarked image degraded.
The performance of the proposed scheme is compared to complementary 
modulation (Lu et al) methods. In order to make a fair comparison, where each method 
carries the same amount of data, the (248,124) and (248,62) RS codes were used for the Lu 
et al. method and the proposed method respectively. In the detection of the proposed 
method, the decoder used both (248,62) and (124,62), using erasures, for each of the two 
modulations subsequently taking the best result. This is illustrated in Figure 3-4.
Then, several attacks were applied by using Matlab functions and StirMark 3.1
[81,82] to test the robustness of those algorithms before detection. Table 3-1 shows the 
maximum attack level, which the watermark still can survive. The embedded watermark is 
categorized as successfully detected if its SIM is larger than the threshold, i.e. 6.
(248,62):
Paritv Paritv Paritv Data
62 62 62 62
(124,62):
Paritv Data
1 Erasure 62 62
Paritv Paritv
62 62 Erasure
V  Take the best
Figure 3-4: Enhanced Complementary Modulation Decoder
As can be seen from Table 3-1, the proposed scheme is more robust for these 
attacks: Gaussian noise, low JPEG compression, rotation, and scaling. Like the other
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scheme, the proposed method is not robust against the StirMark random geometric attack. 
However, this issue will be discussed in the next section.
Table 3-1. Robustness against various attacks
Attacks Lu et al. method Proposed method
Gaussian noise, mean=0 var < 0.012 var < 0.035
Low JPEG Q F > 9 Q F > 1
Rotation: 1. detect directly offset < 0.5° offset <0.9°
2. re-rotate any angle any angle
Scaling SF > 0.4 SF > 0.3
Cropping cropped <85% Cropped <85%
StirMark Random Geometric Fail Fail
Figure 3-5 shows the SIMs of the two methods against other attacks, i.e. FMLR, 
median filter, sharpening, linear geometric transforms, aspect ratio changing, and row & 
column removing, where for these attacks the proposed scheme is better and the 
watermarks can be detected successfully.
CO
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
b d f h ka c e 9 m n o P q
Attacks
■ Proposed method - -o - Lu et al method
Figure 3-5; Robustness Against Various Attacks
(a)FMLR (b)2x2 Median Filter (c)3x3 Median Filter (d)Sharpening 3x3 (e)Linear Geometric Transform 1.007,0.010, 
0.010,1.012 (f)Linear Geometric Transform 1.010, 0.013, 0.009, 1.011 (g)Linear Geometric Transform 1.013, 0.008, 
0.011, 1.008 (h)Aspect Ratio x:0.8 y;1.0 (i)Aspect Ratio x:0.9 y:1.0 (j)Aspect Ratio x:1.0 y:0.8 (k)Aspect Ratio x:1.0 
y:0.9 (l)Aspect Ratio x:1.0 y : l .l  (m)Aspect Ratio x:1.0 y:1.2 (n)Aspect Ratio x : l . l  y.1.0 (o)Aspect Ratio x:1.2 y:1.0 
(p)17 Row 5 Col Removed (q)l Row 5 Col Removed
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3.3 Comments on Combating StirMark Attack by Coefficients 
Relocation
Several counter attacks for combating the StirMark random geometric and bending
[81,82] have been proposed such as in [78] by un-warping the distorted image with help of 
feature points and in [30] by using Delaunay triangulation.
To cope with this random geometric attack, Lu et al [66,67,68] suggested a 
relocating method based on the watermarked image prior to the detection. However, from 
our simulation it was found that this method can produce a false positive result. Therefore, 
we propose another valid method to deal with this attack.
In the relocating method, first the wavelet coefficients of the attacked watermarked 
image A  and the (un-attacked) watermarked image V’ are both sorted. Then, the sorted 
coefficients of the attacked watermarked image Ca are reshuffled / un-sorted based on the 
index or the original position of the watermarked coefficients IDXy. This method is 
illustrated in Figure 3-6. It was reported in [66,67,68] that by using this method the 
detector response is significantly improved.
IDX
IDX
DWT SORT
DWT SORT DETECTUN-SORT
WATERMARKED
IMAGE
ATTACKED
WATERMARKED
IMAGE
Figure 3-6: Lu e t  a l ’s  [66,67,68] Relocating Method
A simulation to test the validity of this method against false positives was carried 
out, by applying an image with no watermark as an ‘attacked watermarked image’ into the 
complementary modulation detection. Surprisingly, as can be seen from Figure 3-7, the 
‘watermark’ can be detected. Then, for further validation, this relocating method was also
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applied to watermarking scheme with single modulation [110] for both binary and real 
watermark data, where similar false positives were also shown.
'0 200 400 „60Q 800 1000
Watermark Data Index
Figure 3-7: False Positive Detection From Un-Watermarked Image, Using Relocation Method
Realocate
‘Attacked
Watermarked
Image’
Watermarked
Image
Recovered 
W atermarked Image
W aterm ark  D ata  Index
Detection Result
Figure 3-8: Coefficients Relocation of Two Different Images
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Another experiment was carried out; ‘Girl’ image with no watermark was used as an 
‘attacked watermarked image’ and ‘Lena’ image was used as the real watermarked image. 
As can be seen from Figure 3-8, an image quite similar to ‘Lena’ was created and the false 
positive detection was also produced. It is therefore believed that the amending method 
described in [66,67,68] is invalid and another valid method to combat this attack is needed.
3.4 Combating StirMark Random Geometric Attack by Pixel 
Replacement
Regarding the problem discussed in the previous section, we propose another method 
to amend the StirMark attacked watermarked image. The basic idea came from a method 
to test robustness against cropping which was described in [26]. In this method the cropped 
parts of the image are replaced by similar parts from the original image with no 
watermarks prior to the detection. This principle can be applied for combating StirMark if 
the attacked parts are known. Thus, firstly the attacked parts of the image should be 
determined.
REFERENCE IMAGE
SUSPECT IMAGE
ORIGINAL IMAGE
WATERMARK
DETECTION
REFERENCED PARAMETER
CHANGE SOME ALTERED PIXELS 
OF THE SUSPECT IMAGE 
■ WITH THE PIXELS FROM THE 
ORIGINAL IMAGE
Figure 3-9: Pixels Replacement Method
3.4.1 Method
A block diagram of the algorithm is shown in Figure 3-9. The attacked pixels can be 
approximated by taking a difference between the attacked watermarked image (suspect 
image) and a reference image. Ideally, the watermarked image containing the same 
watermark as the suspect image should be used as the reference image. Nevertheless, in a 
fingerprinting application where each recipient has a unique watermark, it is not possible
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to identify which watermark was being embedded into the suspect image. Hence, 
alternatively, we can use the original image as a reference. ,
By using this difference, we can determine how many pixels should be changed. 
Then, after replacing the attacked pixels by pixels from the original image, the detection 
can be completed. It should be noted that there is a trade off in determining the number of 
attacked pixels that should be changed. Changing only few pixels may not reduce the 
effect of the attack. On the other hand, replacing too many pixels may reduce the 
robustness of the scheme against cropping.
3.4.2 Experimental Results
The spread spectrum watermarking scheme in the DCT domain suggested by Cox et 
al [26] was used to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed method. The watermark X  is 
inserted into transform coefficients of image V to obtain the watermarked image V \  by 
using the formula as stated in equation (2-18).
In the detection, the original image is needed to extract the watermark. Then, the 
similarity between the extracted watermark %* and the original watermark X  is measured 
by equation (2-19).
The simulation was conducted by using Matlab where the parameters were set as 
follows. A set of 1000 series of normally distributed random numbers with mean zero and 
variance one, where each series contains 1000 numbers, were provided. Then one series, 
i.e. # 500, was selected and used as a watermark, and the greyscale 512x512 Lena image 
was used as a host image. The watermark level a  was set to 0.1. After embedding the 
watermark, the StirMark 3.1 random geometric and bending attack was applied. Then, the 
proposed method was performed to amend the watermarked image.
Two different reference images, i.e. watermarked image and original image, were 
applied to study the effectiveness of the method. In the case of the watermarked image as 
reference, all of the 1000 possible series were tested. An example of the difference 
between the suspect image and the reference image is shown in Figure 3-10. White pixels 
indicate high difference between the two images or, in other words, they point to the 
highly distorted parts. The number of pixels which will be changed can be controlled by 
choosing the related difference parameter:
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DIFF  (m, v) = y  (m, v) -  y  ^  (m, V) (3-3)
where V^{u,v)  is the intensity of a reference image in pixel (m,v) and (u,v) is the 
intensity of the suspect image in pixel (m,v) . In the experiments, several values of DIFF 
were chosen so that around 20% to 80% of the pixels were replaced.
Figure 3-10: Difference between suspect and original images
Table 3-2 shows the experimental results. It can be seen that with watermarked 
images as the reference, changing around 30% to 50% of the attacked pixels will give valid 
results. The result is categorized to be valid if the SIM value when series #500 is used in 
the reference, is larger than the SIM values when the other 999 possible references are 
used.
If the original image is used as a reference, valid results are obtained when 34.3% to 
46.1% of the attacked pixels are changed. Figures 3-11 (a) and (b) show the detection of 
the watermark by using the watermarked image and the original image respectively.
Validity of this method against false positives was assessed by applying an image 
with no watermark as a suspect image and the watermarked images as a reference. The 
experiments showed that no watermarks were detected.
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This method was also simulated for the watermarking scheme in DWT domain 
[110], and similar results were obtained.
Table 3-2: Detection results for various reference image and D I F F
SUSPECT IMAGE REFERENCE IMAGE DIFF PIXELS CHANGED (%) RESULTS
StirMarked Attacked 
Watermarked Image 
(watermarked # : 500)
Watermarked Image 
(watermark#; 1-1000)
>0.014 71-83 Invalid
>0.040 44-53 valid
> 0.050 39-47 valid
> 0.065 33 - 37 valid
> 0.100 24-26 Invalid
Original Image > 0.010 82.5 Invalid
> 0.040 46.1 valid
> 0.050 41.2 valid
> 0.065 34.3 valid
>0.100 25.1 Invalid
Original Image 
(no watermark)
Watermark Image #: 500 > 0.050 0.035 undetected
>0.010 47.18 undetected
Watermark Image #: 100 > 0.050 0.012 undetected
>0.010 45.69 undetected
500
Watermark Data Index
(a)
500
Watermark Data index
(b)
Figure 3-11: Detection of the watermark by using
(a) watermarked image
(b) original image
1000
3.5 Conclusions
The original contribution and advantages of the proposed schemes in this chapter can 
be summarized as follows. First, an improvement of complementary modulation 
watermarking method by Lu et al [66,67,68] was presented. By using the enhanced
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method, similarity value produced in the detector can be increased. In other words, this 
improves the robustness.
Second, comments on existing method by the same author to combat the StirMark 
random geometric attack was raised. In their method a false positive detection occurs if 
any image without watermark is processed as a suspect image.
Third, another method to combat this random geometric attack was proposed. By 
processing the attacked image using our method before the detection, the watermark can be 
detected successfully. This method does not produce a false positive detection if an un- 
watermarked image is processed. Furthermore, this method can be used in conjunction 
with DCT or DWT watermarking methods. Nevertheless, since this result is based on one 
test image, experiments with various images are needed in order to investigate the effect of 
pixel replacement required over different images.
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Chapter 4
4 Texture Based Image Watermarking and 
Oblivious Detection
4.1 Introduction
Many existing watermarking schemes, including DCT and DWT spread spectrum 
watermarking explained in chapter two, are not robust against the StirMark random 
geometric attack [81,82]. In the several proposed random geometric counter attacks such 
as methods by using un-warping [78], Delaunay triangulation [30] and our method 
described in the previous section, image restorations are performed prior to the detection.
In this chapter, several image watermarking schemes which are robust against 
various attacks including StirMark will be proposed. It should be noted that in one of these 
methods, the pre-detection process is not required. Furthermore, the watermarks embedded 
using those schemes are imperceptible.
As in some cases the un-watermarked original image cannot be made available for 
the detection, we also propose an oblivious / blind detection method. This method can be 
applied in conjunction with the above methods, or other methods such as spread spectrum 
in AC coefficients of image DCT [26]. Furthermore, this new method has an advantage 
over an existing oblivious detection method proposed by Piva et al [86].
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces basic 
approaches applied in the proposed schemes. As the methods consider image texture and 
employ DC coefficients of DCT domain, these will be described in sections 4.3 and 4.4 
respectively. Section 4.5 describes proposed watermarking schemes in the low texture 
blocks. Section 4.6 explains a watermarking scheme in the high texture blocks. Next, a 
watermarking scheme in both low and high texture blocks is described in section 4.7. 
Then, experimental results of these three watermarking schemes are given in section 4.8.
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In section 4.9, a new watermarking method which does not need an original image for the 
detection is introduced. Finally, section 4.10 will conclude this chapter.
The above schemes have been published and can be found in [3,4]. These have been 
filed also as a UK patent [6].
4.2 Basic Approaches
There are three approaches in our scheme. First, a salient feature of the image, i.e. 
its edges, is considered. As described in the previous chapter, the locations of the distorted 
pixels can be estimated by comparing the original and the attacked image. It is shown in 
Figure 3-9 that the random geometric attack deforms mainly the textured parts of the 
image. Thus, the texture classification should be considered in order to survive against this 
type of attack. Many proposed watermarking schemes consider the texture in the 
embedding. It should be noted, however, that they employ the image texture mainly for 
improving the watermark imperceptibility, for example the methods proposed by Huang 
and Shi [51,52] and Kaewkamnerd and Rao [56], or to reduce the processing times as 
patented by Macro vision [69]. Details of the texture classification method will be 
explained in section 4.3.
The next concern is the selection of the embedding domain. In contrast with the 
method proposed by [26] as described in section 2.10, which avoids embedding the 
watermark in the DC component due to perceptibility reasons, we adopt a method 
proposed by [52] which embeds the watermark in the DC coefficients of the DCT. There 
are two essential reasons for this selection. Firstly, the magnitude of the DC component is 
much larger than any AC components and it has larger perceptual capacity than AC 
components. Secondly, common image processing procedures tend to change DC 
components less than AC components [52,26]. This will be described in more detail in 
section 4.4.
The third feature of our scheme is that an error correcting code is employed for the 
watermark. Digital watermarking embedding and detection can be considered as a 
communication system where the information (i.e. the watermark) is transmitted through a 
channel to the receiver. To overcome the errors which may occur in the channel (i.e. the 
attacks), error control coding can be utilized, and in our proposed scheme a Reed Solomon
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code [70,98,50,111] is used. The properties of Reed Solomon codes have been briefly 
described and can be found in section 3.2.2.
Before explaining the watermark embedding and detection in more detail, the next 
two sub sections will elaborate the texture classification technique and the reason why DC 
coefficients are selected.
4.3 Texture Classification
Before classifying the image texture, firstly the edge detection is performed on the 
entire image producing a binary edge map.
The edge detection method, summarized from [84], will be described briefly as 
follows. There are three steps in the edge detection process. Firstly, examining the 
differences between neighbouring pixels in the image, classify pixels with different 
attribute values to different regions and postulate a boundary, i.e. edges, separating them.
The dissimilarity between neighbouring pixels can be measured by sliding a 
window across the image and at each position the statistical properties of the pixels within 
each half of the window are calculated then compared. The places where these statistical 
properties differ most are where the boundaries of the regions are.
In the second step, the edges are enhanced by masking. For images with low levels 
of noise, Sobel masks are used. For noisy images, the Canny filters should be used, where 
the gradient is calculated using the derivative of a Gaussian filter. The Canny masking 
method meets the following criteria: good signal to noise ratio, good localization, i.e. the 
edge should be detected where it actually is, and small number of false alarms.
Finally, the output produced has to be further processed by non-maxima 
suppression (i.e. the identification of the local maxima in the output array) and 
thresholding (i.e. the retention of only the significant local maxima). In our watermarking 
experiment, the Canny edge detection method was used.
By comparing the number of Is of each 8x8 binary edge map block to a preset 
threshold, the locations of the image with low texture blocks Bl and high texture blocks Bh 
can be classified. In our experiments, the threshold equal to zero is chosen, i.e. if the block 
has one or more Is, it is categorized as a high texture block. Otherwise, it is grouped as a 
low texture block.
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An example of an image, its binary edge map and its low and high texture block 
locations are shown in Figure 4-1 (a), (b), (c), and (d) respectively.
(a) Original Image (b) Edges
(c) Low Texture Blocks (d) High Texture Blocks
Figure 4-1: Image and Its Properties
4.4 Use of DC Component
As described in section 4.2, there are two reasons of selecting DC coefficients of 
image DCT as an embedding domain. Firstly, the DC component is much larger than any 
AC components and it has much larger perceptual capacity than AC components [52]. 
Huang and Shi [52] gave some illustration by firstly comparing the average magnitude of
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8x8 DCT coefficients at different spatial frequencies. The spatial frequency i = m + v , 
where 0 < m, v < 7 is shown in Figure 4-2.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
4 5 6 7 8 9 To 11
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Figure 4-2; Spatial Frequencies i
Then, average magnitudes are computed as follows:
^  &=0
^  É x t i n  (0,1)| +\F, d,0)|]
k=o ^
masH) = (0,2)| + \F, (2,0)| + |F, (V)|]
K  k= Q  à
1 x - l  1 
mag{i) = —  ^
w+y=:
I = 0 to 14
(4-1)
where K  is the total number of 8x8 blocks in an image.
The comparison of magnitude of spatial frequency i from 0 to 14 of the ‘Lena’ 
image is shown in Figure 4-3. It can be seen that the magnitude of the DC component is 
much larger than the other components.
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Figure 4-3: Magnitudes Of DCT Components in Different Spatial Frequency
Image watermarking can be viewed as superimposing a weak signal (i.e. 
watermark) onto a strong background signal (i.e. image). The superimposed signals can be 
detected by the HVS only if they exceed its detection threshold.
Compared with AC components, DC components cannot be changed by a larger 
percentage in order to avoid block artefacts under the constraint of invisibility. They can 
however be modified by a much larger quantity due to their huge peak in the magnitude 
distribution. This observable fact indicates that DC components have much larger 
perceptual capacity than AC components [52].
The second reason for selecting the DC components is that common image 
processing procedures such as data compression, filtering, or sub-sampling tend to change 
DC components less than AC components [52,26].
Huang and Shi [52] carried out experiments to compare the robustness performance 
of watermarking in DC and AC coefficients against JPEG compression and additive noise. 
The experiments were conducted as follows. Binary random {-1,1} watermark is 
embedded using equation (2-18). For watermarking in DC and AC components the 
watermarks are embedded in the spatial frequency (0,0) and ((1,0) and (2,0)) respectively. 
The scaling factor a  is changed for embedding in DC and AC components respectively in 
order to have the PSNRs of the watermarked image the same (i.e. 44.1 dB). The robustness
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results against Gaussian noise and JPEG compression are shown in Figure 4-4 (a) and (b) 
respectively. It can be seen that the similarity values of watermarking in DC coefficients 
are significantly larger than that in AC coefficients.
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Figure 4-4: Robustness Comparison, Embedding in DC and AC Components [52]
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4.5 Watermarking in Low Texture Blocks
After performing texture classification of the image, there are three possible 
approaches in our method, namely; watermarking in low or high texture blocks alone or in 
both low and high texture blocks. For the third approach, there are two possible embedding 
methods and this will be explained in section 4.7.
In the first approach, only the blocks with low texture, Bl, are watermarked. The 
block diagram of this method is shown in Figure 4-5.
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possibly attacked 
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original image
set of watermarks
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Y
DCT in 
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RS decode similaritycheck
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Figure 4-5: Low Texture Watermarking
In the embedding, first, the 8x8 low texture blocks of the image are identified, 
using the method explained in section 4.3. Then, the DCT is applied to those blocks. The 
binary watermark is encoded using a Reed Solomon code. Then, the encoded watermark X  
is inserted into the DC coefficients of the low texture blocks V to obtain the watermarked 
coefficients V’, using the formula in equation (2-18).
In the detection, the 8x8 DCTs are applied to the suspect image and the original 
image. Next, the watermark is extracted by using the inverse of equation (2-18). Then, the 
extracted watermark X* is compared to a set of watermarks X  using the similarity
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measurement as stated in equation (2-19). The Z* is considered to be matched with X  if 
SIM > T, where T  is some threshold. The selection of T is calculated by using equations (2- 
13) or (2-14) for the required false detection probability. For a watermark X  of length 1000 
random numbers, the SIM value for an un-attacked image is typically around 30. 
Therefore, by setting the threshold T to 6, the maximum false detection probability of 
3.74x10'^^ can be guaranteed.
4.6 Watermarking in High Texture Blocks
In this second approach, the watermark bits are embedded into the high texture 
blocks only. The blocks to be embedded are chosen randomly from the. available high 
texture blocks, Bh- Figures 4-6 (a) and (b) show the block diagram of the embedding and 
the detection respectively.
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Figure 4-6: High Texture Watermarking
To survive attacks which are applied linearly to the entire image, such as rotation 
or scaling, the attacked image should be amended by re-rotating or re-scaling with the 
inverse parameters prior to the watermark extraction. However, if the attack is randomly
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applied to every block or pixel, the previous strategy will not help. Instead, local 
restoration should be carried out by locating the original positions of each distorted block.
In our scheme, the original positions of the distorted watermarked blocks are 
estimated with the help of the un-attacked reference image, which can be the original 
image un-watermarked or with any watermark based on the implemented scheme. The 
scheme is illustrated in Figure 4-7(a). First, the position of the 8x8 pixel watermarked 
block is located in the reference image and its edges, Er, is detected. Then, the position of 
this block on the attacked image, O a , is marked. Next, a 24x24 window surrounding O a is 
determined. Finally, E r  are compared to the edges of every possible 8x8 blocks of the 
attacked image, Ea, within Er. The matched block is estimated by searching the maximum 
peak of the two-dimensional cross-correlation.
A brief review of a cross-correlation of signals is as follows. Suppose that we have 
two real signal sequences x{n) and y{n),  each of which has finite energy. The cross­
correlation of %(fz) and y{n) is a sequence (Z), which is defined as [88]:
Z =  o , ± i , ± 2, . . .  (4 -2 )
For two dimensional signals x{m,n)  and y (m ,« ), their two dimensional cross-correlation 
[73] can be calculated by:
^ x { m , n ) y { m - k , n - l )  A: = 0 ,± 1 ,± 2 ,...
(4-3)
Z = 0 ,± 1 ,± 2 ,...
In practice, we can limit the output size so that for two matrices with size MxN  each, the 
size of its cross-correlation is 2M -7x2A-7.
An example of the block cross correlation is illustrated in Figure 4-7(b). The same 
procedure is then applied for all watermarked blocks in the high texture, Bh-
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(a) Original block and its searching window (b) Example of matched cross correlation blocks
Figure 4-7; Search and Match
An example of restoration vectors of each block indicating movement from the 
distorted block to its original position of the random geometric attacked watermarked 
image ‘Lena’ is shown in Figure 4-8.
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Figure 4-8: Restoration Vectors
After the actual positions of the watermarked blocks are approximated, the 
watermark can be extracted by the inverse of equation (2-18) and compared to the set of 
watermarks by using equation (2-19).
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4.7 Watermarking in Low and High Texture Blocks
There are two methods involved in this third approach. Firstly, as illustrated in 
Figure 4-9(a), the same watermark is embedded redundantly in both the low and high 
texture blocks. Then, as can be seen in Figure 4-9(b), in the detection the best result can be 
taken. Or, in other words, we u s e ‘texture diversity’.
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Figure 4-9: Texture Diversity Watermarking
Secondly, as can be seen in Figure 4-10, the watermark is divided into two subsets, 
which are then randomly embedded in the low and high texture block. In the detection of 
both schemes, if needed, the search and match method can be applied to the high texture 
blocks only.
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Figure 4-10: Watermarking in Low and High Texture Blocks
4.8 Texture Based Watermarking Experimental Results
The robustness of the schemes proposed in the previous sections were tested by 
using a simulation, which was carried out in Matlab. A set of 1000 series of binary {-1,1} 
data, with length 999 bits each, was supplied. Then, one of them was applied in 
conjunction with a RS(511,396) code, shortened to RS(226,111), to watermark a 512x512 
pixel ‘Lena’ test image.
With the intention of making the watermark imperceptible, the watermark strength 
levels for the low texture blocks a  l and high texture blocks a  h were set to 0.008 and 
0.015 respectively. Since the human visual system is less sensitive in the high texture 
image, the watermark strength in these blocks can be set higher than in the low texture 
blocks [105]. These parameter levels produced the PSNR = 49.75 dB and 45.68 dB for the 
watermarked image in low and high texture respectively. The original and watermarked
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images in the low and high texture blocks are shown in Figure 4-11 (a), (b) and (c) 
respectively.
Next, StirMark was utilized to attack the watermarked image. Finally, the 
watermark was extracted from the attacked watermarked image and detected by using the 
similarity measurement in equation (2-19). An example of the successful watermark 
detection from a random geometric attacked image is shown in Figure 4-12, where the 
SIM of extracted watermark is above the threshold, and can be clearly distinguished from 
the other SIMs of watermarks provided.
(a) Original Image
(b) Embedded in Low Texture Blocks (c) Embedded in High Texture Blocks
Figure 4-11: Original and Texture Based Watermarked Images
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200., 400 . „600,  ^ 800 1000Watermark Data index
Figure 4-12: Detection Result of a Random Geometric Attacked Image
Table 4-1: Robustness Against Various Attacks
Best Result Taken (Texture Diversity) Combined
High Texture Blocks Low Texture Blocks (Random Embedding)
No Attacks SIM Clearly 
Detected ?
SIM Clearly 
Detected ?
SIM Clearly 
D etected ?
1 17 rows 5 col removed 21.8623 Yes 26.6713 Yes 22.5583 Yes
2 1 rows 5 col removed 27.6205 Yes 27.4307 Yes 31.6070 Yes
3 1 rows 1 col removed 31.6070 Yes 31.6070 Yes 31.6070 Yes
4 5 rowsi col removed 31.6070 Yes 27.1143 Yes 31.6070 Yes
5 5 rows 17 col removed 23.6340 Yes 25.9120 Yes 24.9629 Yes
6 2x2 median filter 14.3323 Yes 21.8623 Yes 13.2566 Yes
7 3x3 median filter 14.4588 Yes 24.8363 Yes 14.9018 Yes
8 4x4 median filter 6.8656 Yes 17.8758 Yes 5.6000 Yes
9 FMLR 10.8520 Yes 8.5108 Yes 8.9537 Yes
10 Gaussian Filtering 3x3 27.4307 Yes 24.0137 Yes 26.6713 Yes
11 JPEG 10 11.8012 Yes 4.5876 Yes 10.8520 Yes
12 Linear Filter 1.007 0.010 0.010 1.012 7.1187 Yes 11.7379 Yes 7.3718 Yes
13 Linear Filter 1.010 0.013 0.009 1.001 7.2452 Yes 11.6114 Yes 7.8780 Yes
14 Linear Filter 1.013 0.008 0.011 1.008 9.2068 Yes 13.0667 Yes 9.9662 Yes
15 Ratio X 0.8 V1.0 26.6081 Yes 26.4182 Yes 27.6838 Yes
16 Ratio X 0.9 V 1.0 28.8860 Yes 27.1776 Yes 31.6070 Yes
17 Ratio X 1.0 y 0.8 20.5967 Yes 26.2284 Yes 21.4826 Yes
18 Ratio X 1.0 y 0.9 25.5956 Yes 31.6070 Yes 31.6070 Yes
19 Ratio X 1.0 V 1.1 17.1165 Yes 24.8996 Yes 17.8758 Yes
20 Ratio X 1.0 V1.2 21.0397 Yes 26.3550 Yes 20.7866 Yes
21 Ratio X 1.1 V 1.0 23.8239 Yes 25.7222 Yes 24.7730 Yes
22 Ratio X 1.2 y 1.0 27.1776 Yes 26.2917 Yes 27.8736 Yes
23 Sharpening 3x3 22.7482 Yes 23.8239 Yes 22.2419 Yes
24 Cropped, 84.4% removed 7.5616 Yes
25 Cropped, 52.7% removed 7.0554 Yes
26 Cropped, 85.4% removed 8.7006 Yes
27 StirMark Random Geo. & Bending-1 3 4475 Yes 9.2701 Yes
28 StirMark Random Geo. & Bending-2 7.3085 Yes 6.8656 Yes
29 StirMark Random Geo. & Bending-3 7.2452 Yes 7.8147 Yes , , " '
30 StirMark Random Geo. & Bending-4 7.8147 Yes 1.3605 No
31 StirMark Random Geo. & Bending-5 8.2577 Yes 10.4091 Yes r. -.j
32 StirMark Random Geo. & Bending-6 9.2068 Yes 5.9164 Yes
33 StirMark Random Geo. & Bending-7 10.4091 Yes 6.4226 Yes - '
34 StirMark Random Geo. & Bending-8 6.9921 Yes 2.0565 No
35 StirMark Random Geo. & Bending-9 8.5741 Yes
36 StirMark Random Geo. & Bending-10 A' .V 10.2825 Yes
37 StirMark Random Geo. & Bending-11 10.8520 Yes
38 StirMark Random Geo. & Bending-12 10.3458 Yes
39 StirMark Random Geo. & Bending-13 8.2577 Yes
40 StirMark Random Geo. & Bending-14 8.4475 Yes
41 StirMark Random Geo. & Bending-15 8.2577 Yes
42 StirMark Random Geo. & Bending-16 8.5108 Yes
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The results of the three approaches described in the previous sections, are shown in 
Table 4-1. It should be noted that in the high texture blocks detection, the search and match 
strategy is applied only to the watermarked image attacked by StirMark random geometric 
and bending.
It can be seen from the table that for non random geometric and bending attacks, 
the SIM of extracted watermark can be clearly detected and distinguished from other 
watermark SIMs. Although for some cases the SIMs are slightly less than the threshold 6, 
which means they have higher false detection probabilities, at least one of the detection 
methods is more than the threshold. For example in low compression JPEG 10 attack, the 
SIMs for high, low, and combined texture methods are 11.80, 4.59, and 10.85 respectively.
For random geometric attacks, the performance of the high and combined texture 
watermarking are more consistent than the low texture scheme. This is illustrated in Figure
4-13 as well.
10 -
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•High Txt 
-Low Txt 
-Com bine
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Figure 4-13: Robustness Against StirMark Attacks for Three Different Methods
4.9 Oblivious/ Blind Detection Watermarking
By making the image watermarking system oblivious, the original un-watermarked 
image is not needed in the detection, so that it can be kept secret. Piva et al [86] proposed 
an oblivious / blind detection method using the correlation of the marked coefficients and 
the watermarks. In their simulations, they used a sequence of 16000 real numbers as a 
watermark. In our implementation of their method, as described in section 2.13, we have 
found that this size can be reduced, and the watermark successfully detected, using binary
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data of minimum length around 3000 bits. Even this will cause a problem, however, if 
there is only limited space for the watermark, such as in block discrete cosine transform 
(DCT) watermarking in the DC coefficient suggested by Huang and Shi [52] or the 
proposed methods described in the previous sections.
Instead, we propose a scheme which does not require a minimum number of 
watermark bits, by pre-processing the original image. This method may be used in 
conjunction with those robust image watermarking methods in the DC coefficient of the 
DCT.
To assess its performance, our algorithm is applied in conjunction with 
watermarking schemes in a DC DCT as described in section 4.7 and with spread spectrum 
AC DCT as suggested by Cox et al [26]. Then, the StirMark attacks [81,82] are applied to 
test the robustness.
4.9.1 Pre-Processing Method
In this method the DCT coefficients of the image are first sorted and grouped into 
pairs. Each pair is made up of two coefficients which are closest together in value within a 
preset threshold. The average of each selected pair is then taken and each coefficient in the 
pair modified to the average value, so that the modified coefficients are made up of a 
number of equal pairs Cp Cp*.
The watermark X. is embedded into coefficients V to obtain the watermarked 
coefficients V \ using the formula in equation (2-18), in only one of each selected pair of 
coefficients, Cp. The other of the pair, c^ *, is left at its modified value. The parameter CK is a 
scaling factor to control the watermark level, which in turn affects the watermark 
imperceptibility. This embedding technique is shown in Figure 4-14.
When using this method for block DCT watermarking, the image is first divided 
into non-overlapped 8x8 blocks, then the above procedure is applied to the block DC DCT 
coefficients. To use the method with spread spectrum DCT [26], the DCT is applied to the 
entire image, and then the same procedure is applied to the most significant AC 
coefficients.
In the detection, the watermark is extracted by comparing the values of the pair of 
coefficients Cp Cp* using the inverse of equation (2-18). Then, the extracted watermark X* is
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compared to a set of watermarks X  using the similarity measurement as suggested in 
equation (2-19).
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Figure 4-14: Pre-processing and Embedding Method
There are two detection scenarios in this scheme. First, as shown in Figure 4-15, 
the watermark is extracted by using Cp* coefficients of the possibly attacked watermarked 
image itself. Alternatively, as shown in Figure 4-16, the Cp* coefficients may be determined 
from any un-attacked copy of the imagé, even if a different watermark is embedded in it.
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check
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Figure 4-15: Detection Using The Watermarked Image Itself
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Figure 4-16: Detection Using Un-Attacked Watermarked Image
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4.9.2 Experimental Results
In the simulation for block DCT watermarking as described in section 4.7, a series 
of 1000 binary {-1,1} data sequences, with length 999 bits each, were generated. Then, one 
of them was applied in conjunction with a Reed Solomon code, to watermark a 512x512 
pixel Lena test image. As can be seen from Figure 4-17, there is no significant degradation 
of the pre-processed and the watermarked images, with the peak signal to noise ratios 
(PSNRs) being 61.03 dB and 47.51 dB respectively.
(a) Original Image
« %
(b) Pre-processed Image (c) Watermarked Image
Figure 4-17: Images Produced in the Oblivious Detection Scenario
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For simulating the spread spectrum watermarking [26], a set of 1000 series of 
random real numbers, with length 1000 each were used. The imperceptibility of this 
method is also high, the, PSNRs for the pre-processed and the watermarked images being 
40.92 dB and 38.18 dB respectively.
In terms of the robustness. Table 4-2 shows the SIM results against various attacks, 
using the suspect image itself (Figure 4-15) or using any watermarked version of the image 
(Figure 4-16) for the detection. It should be noted that for the spread spectrum method 
[26], to combat the random geometric attack, we applied a pixel replacement method as 
suggested in section 3.4. It can be seen that the second scenario offers better performance, 
because the un-watermarked Cp* coefficients will be uncorrupted by any attack.
Table 4-2: Blind Detection Robustness
DC DCT AC DCT
Scenario-1 Scenario-2 Scenario-1 Scenario-2
No Attacks SIM SIM SIM SIM
1 17 rows 5 col removed 18.5903 22.0760 11.8718 23.8046
2 1 rows 5 col removed 26.2717 27.6273 28.3211 29.9884
3 1 rows 1 col removed . 30.9839 30.9839 31.7915 31.8564
4 5 rowsi col removed 22.657 25.1744 20.3998 27.0200
5 5 rows 17 col removed 19.3004 21.6887 19.1143 24.9269
6 2x2 median filter 9.4243 12.2644 1.5434 * 19.4228
7 3x3 median filter 14.3946 9.5534 7.5856 25.8084
8 4x4 median filter 5.2931 6.6486 0.7008 * 8.8142
9 FMLR 6.3259 9.2952 17.0346 15.1158
10 Gaussian Filtering 3x3 23.8188 24.7871 13.7414 27.5080
11 JPEG 10 4.9058 10.4571 14.4661 - 20.3663
12 LF 1.007 0.010 0.010 1.012 5.2285 6.9714 -0.3697 * 4.4441
13 LF 1.010 0.013 0.009 1.001 3.4857 * 6.7777 -0.1533 * 3.7751
14 LF 1.013 0.008 0.011 1.008 5.2931 7.2296 1.5059 * 5.2931
15 Ratio X 0.8 y 1.0 23.1734 24.8516 25.7884 29.5929
16 Ratio X 0.9 y 1.0 24.5934 27.0463 29.8956 30.8635
17 Ratio X 1.0 y 0.8 17.6866 21.8178 24.2445 26.9332
18 Ratio X 1.0 y  0.9 20.2041 23.5606 27.4275 29.2833
19 Ratio X 1.0 y 1.1 15.1046 18.1385 9.4656 21.2548
20 Ratio X 1.0 y 1.2 17.8157 21.3660 11.9368 24.8142
21 Ratio X 1.1 y 1.0 19.9459 22.2051 3.857 26.1906
22 Ratio X 1.2 y  1.0 22.7861 24.8516 19.7179 28.7433
23 Sharpening 3x3 16.9766 20.1395 18.6754 17.1233
24 Cropped, 85.7% removed 7.8751 8.1978
25 Cropped, 86.2 % removed 13.0083 17.9282
26 S.Mark Rand. Geo.-I 0.3227 * 9.5534 11.6872 14.5256
27 S.Mark Rand. Geo.-2 1.2264 * 9.4888 8.8919 12.6910
28 S.Mark Rand. Geo.-3 0.8391 * 9.0370 10.3389 14.9940
29 S.Mark Rand. Geo.-4 0.4518 * 10.9089 9.0127 15.8570
30 S.Mark Rand. Geo.-5 1.0328 * 9.4243 10.7711 14.4023
31 8 .Mark Rand. Geo.-6 0.7746 * 6.5195 7.9628 12.3201
32 S.Mark Rand. Geo.-7 1.1619 * 8.9079 9.8975 15.6381
33 S.Mark Rand. Geo.-8 0.2582 * 10.4571 7.6174 13.0043
Detection failed
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The performance of the proposed method was also compared against the existing 
oblivious detection method suggested by [86] as described in section 2.13. In this 
experiment a set of 100 series of random real numbers were provided. Then, one of the 
watermarks was embedded in ‘Lena’ images using those two schemes.
For the existing scheme [86] the watermark was embedded in the highest AC 
coefficients of the DCT. Then, the watermark was detected by using correlation in 
equation (2-30). For the proposed scheme, the highest AC coefficients are pre-processed 
and the embedding and detection were carried out by the method described in the previous 
section. In order to make a fair comparison, the embedding strengths, 6%, were adjusted 
independently until both watermarked images have similar PSNR, i.e. 37 dB. The values 
of a  for the Piva et al method are 0.206 and 0.209 for watermark length of 5000 and 2000 
respectively. For the proposed method, the values of a  are 0.219 and 0.223 for watermark 
length of 5000 and 2000 respectively. Finally, the detection results were compared.
Piva et al method
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Figure 4-18: Comparison of Detection Results, Watermark Length 5000
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Figure 4-19: Comparison of Detection Results, Watermark Length 2000
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Figures 4-18 and 4-19 show the detection results with watermark length being 5000 
and 2000 respectively. From those figures, it can be seen that the proposed method has 
higher difference between the SIM of the correct detected watermark and the incorrect 
watermarks. Thus, the proposed method has lower false positive response rate.
4.10 Conclusions
From the descriptions in the previous sections, it can be seen that image 
watermarking methods which are transparent and robust against various attacks have been 
proposed. They are also robust against StirMark random geometric attack which is known 
to be difficult to combat. .
By embedding the watermark in the most significant components, i.e. the DC 
coefficients of the image DCT, and by considering the texture of the image, three possible 
schemes are proposed. The methods are to watermark in low or high texture alone or in 
both textures. To be robust against random geometric attack, a search and match method is 
applied in the high texture watermarking detection. Thus, depending on the image nature, 
the watermark can be embedded in the low or high texture alone or in both.
Finally, for the case that the un-watermarked original image cannot be made 
available to the detector, an oblivious detection method has been proposed. The 
simulations of this method, with either the block DCT in DC coefficients or spread 
spectrum in AC coefficients of DCT watermarking schemes, showed its robustness. 
Furthermore, compared to the existing detection method proposed by Piva et al [86], this 
method has an advantage i.e. shorter length of watermark can be used.
The texture based image watermarking methods described in this chapter, as well 
as the blind detection method, will be extended into video. This will be described in more 
detail in the next chapter.
. It should be noted that the experiment on the proposed texture based watermarking 
method and the oblivious detection described in this chapter was using one test image 
only, thus more experiment on various images might be needed to assess its performance. 
Nevertheless, it will be shown in the next chapter that the same methods have been applied 
to a video sequence (equivalent to 30 images plus MPEG compression attack) and a good 
level of robustness is achieved.
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Chapter 5
5 Video Digital Watermarking
5.1 Introduction
Similar to image watermarking, digital watermarking in video can be applied to 
protect the copyright or to track its distribution. However, there are other applications of 
digital watermarking on video. For instance, in broadcast monitoring, by embedding 
watermarks in commercial advertisements, an automated monitoring system can verify 
whether advertisements are broadcasted as contracted [57]. Not only commercials but also 
valuable TV products can be protected by broadcast monitoring. As reported by Langelaar 
et al [64] in 2000, news items can have a value of over US$100,000 per hour, which make 
them very vulnerable to intellectual property rights violation. A broadcast surveillance 
system can check all broadcast channels and charge the TV stations according to their 
findings.
Another application of this is for DVD copy protection. In combination with 
encryption, watermarking can be applied to prevent the users from copying a copyrighted 
disk or, alternatively, to allow only a single copy [27]. Yet another watermarking 
application is for indexing, where by indexing the movies or news items, markers and 
comments can be inserted so that it can be used by search engines [64].
In designing a video watermarking scheme, one can start from image watermarking. 
As video sequences consist of a series of consecutive and equally time-spaced still images, 
the general problem of watermarking seems very similar for images and video sequences. 
Thus, the idea that image watermarking techniques are directly applicable to video 
sequences is obvious, and there are a lot of publications on image watermarking which 
conclude with the remark that the proposed approach is also applicable to video. However, 
there are also some differences between images and video which suggest specific 
approaches for video [44].
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Most video watermarking applications have at least two requirements, namely 
perceptual transparency and robustness. The watermarking algorithm should embed the 
watermark such that this does not affect the quality of the host data. However, since users 
of watermarked data normally do not have access to the original data, they can not perform 
the comparison. Thus, it may be sufficient that the modifications in the watermarked data 
go unnoticed as long as the data are not compared with the original data [102]. In terms of 
the robustness of video watermarking, as well as attacks similar to those applied in image 
watermarking, attacks that exploit temporal property such as frame dropping or frame 
averaging should also be taken into account.
There are two main approaches in video watermarking, namely watermarking in the 
compressed domain or in the uncompressed domain. The MPEG video compression uses 
hybrid-coding schemes [42]. These are based on the principles of motion compensated 
prediction and DCT block-based transform coding. MPEG uses three different frame 
types: the I or intra frame, P or predicted frame and B or bi-directional frame. The intra 
coded (I) frames are split into blocks of 8x8 pixels which are compressed using the DCT, 
quantization, zig-zag scan, run level coding and entropy coding (variable length codes / 
VLC). Inter coded (P and B) frames are subject to motion compensation by subtracting a 
motion compensated prediction. Langelaar et al [63] offered two methods of MPEG 
compressed video watermarking. The first method is by replacing variable length codes 
and the second method is based on discarding parts of the compressed video stream. 
Hartung et al [42] proposed a method for watermarking of MPEG-2 compressed video by 
embedding the watermark into the DCT coefficients of MPEG-2 bit stream where the 
watermarks are embedded into DC coefficients of intra blocks and AC coefficients of both 
intra and inter blocks.
Watermarking for uncompressed video using a wavelet transform was proposed by 
Swanson et al [97] and Inoue et al [53], whereas Chae et al [23] presented watermarking 
for uncompressed video in the DCT domain. Video watermarking in the uncompressed 
DPT domain was proposed by Caldelli [22].
In our proposed video watermarking scheme, the image watermarking techniques as 
described in chapter four are applied into video. There are three related original aspects 
reported in this chapter. First, we extend our previous robust image watermarking 
methods, which consider the block texture, into video. The watermark is embedded into
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video on a frame by frame basis in the uncompressed domain. In the detection process, 
watermark extraction is provided with or without original frame. Second, we propose a 
method to improve the imperceptibility by reducing flickering effect. Third, a method to 
detect video scene characteristics in order to suit the particular embedding scheme is 
proposed. By doing so, the embedding method can be chosen adaptively in accordance 
with the video scene. Experiments with various attacks show the robustness and the 
subjective tests illustrate an imperceptibility improvement.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes our 
frame based video watermarking scheme. Then, experiments to test its robustness, which 
were performed by applying MPEG compression and StirMark random geometric attack 
[81,82], are reported in section 5.3. In the next section, the transparency improvement of 
the system is discussed where, in order to produce a good imperceptibility, an approach 
which differs from image watermarking is applied to the selection of embedding blocks. 
Subjective testing was carried out to assess its imperceptibility. Section 5.5 explains a 
method to detect sequence characteristic to suit a particular embedding scheme, as 
different video scene may have different preferred embedding methods. Finally, 
conclusions of this chapter will be given in the section 5.6.
The above proposed schemes have been submitted to the EEE Proceedings of Vision, 
Image and Signal Processing [7].
5.2 Video Watermarking Scheme
In our video watermarking method, first the video sequence is separated into frames. 
If the video is in colour such as in RGB format, each frame should be converted into a 
format which has luminance component, e.g. YUV or YcbCr formats. As the watermark 
will be embedded only in the luminance, the texture of the Y component is then examined 
by using the method described in section 4.3. After the texture classification, the {-1,1} 
watermark is embedded, using equation (2-18), in the DC coefficients of the 8x8 block 
DCT in the low or high texture, similar to our image watermarking scheme described in 
chapter four. In order to improve the robustness, a Reed Solomon code is applied to the 
binary watermark. This procedure is repeated for every frame. Next, the frames containing 
the watermarked luminance components Y in conjunction with their unmodified
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chrominance, U and V components, can be converted into other uncompressed or 
compressed video formats such as MPEG.
In the detection, the watermarked video is converted into its uncompressed form, 
then it is separated again into frames. Next, the watermark can be extracted from the 
luminance component of each frame. The search and match method can be implemented to 
extract the watermark from the frames suffering from severe attacks, such as random 
geometric and bending. Finally, the extracted watermark is compared with the original 
watermark set by using similarity correlation SIM as stated in equation (2-19). The 
watermark is detected if the SIM is larger than threshold T. The selection of T, which is 
related to the false detection probability P/d is described in section 2.7.
5.3 Robustness Assessment
In the experiment, the robustness tests against MPEG compression and the MPEG 
compression followed by the StirMark random geometric attacks, were carried out by a 
method as shown in Figure 5-1. Thirty frames of video sequence ‘Flower garden’ with size 
512x640 were used. One of a set of one thousand watermarks provided was embedded in 
the low and high texture blocks with strength factor a  equals 0.01 and 0.02 respectively. 
The length of the watermark was 999 bits and it was then encoded by.the Reed Solomon 
(226,111) code before embedding.
After embedding the watermark in every frame, the image frames are compressed 
into MPEG format; then it is uncompressed and separated into frames. Finally, other 
attacks such as StirMark random geometric or frame dropping may be applied.
In the detection, the watermark is extracted with or without the help of its original 
frame. For processing watermarked frames suffering from StirMark random geometric 
attack, the search and match procedure as described in chapter four is applied. Finally, the 
similarity between the extracted watermark and the original set of watermarks is 
calculated. In this experiment, the threshold T was set to 6. From equation (2-13), it can be 
calculated that with this threshold the maximum false detection probability of 2.15x10'^^ 
can be guaranteed.
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Figure 5-1: Video Watermarking Robustness Test Configuration
In assessing the robustness against MPEG compression, the watermarked sequence 
was compressed with various rates from 2 to 6 Mbits/sec. Then, after detection, the SIMs 
were examined. Figure 5-2 shows the detection results of non-oblivious high texture 
watermarking, with MPEG-1 compression at 4 Mbits/sec compression rate. Although the 
SIMs are varied between 10.09 to 31.60, all give valid detection (i.e. higher than the 
threshold). For MPEG-2 with the same compression rate, the SIMs fluctuate between 
10.35 and 4.71, and 86.66% of the watermarked frames give valid detection.
MPEG-1 
-<^  MPEG-230 -
25 -
20 -
w
15 -
10  -
10 15 20 25 300 5
frame number
Figure 5-2: Detection Result: High Texture, MPEG Code Rate=4Mbits/S, Non-Oblivious
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Figure 5-3 illustrates the percentage of frame valid detections from the 30 
watermarked frames for various compression rates. For MPEG-1, it can be seen that 
embedding in the high texture gives higher robustness than embedding in the low texture, 
whereas against MPEG-2 compression, embedding in the low texture provides better 
robustness.
120 1
100 -
% 80-
low texture, MPEG-1 
low texture, MPEG-2 
high texture, MPEG-1 
high texture, MPEG-2
20 -
3 4 52 6
MPEG compression bit rate (Mbits/s)
Figure 5-3: Percentage Of Detected Frames Vs MPEG Code Rate, Non-Oblivious
Figure 5-4 shows the results for oblivious video watermarking. In this experiment 
the watermark were randomly embedded in both low and high texture of the pre-processed 
frames as described in chapter four, section 4.7.
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Figure 5-4: Percentage Of Detected Frames Vs MPEG Code Rate, Oblivious
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For the worst case, MPEG-2 with 2 Mbits/s compression rate, 4 out of 30 
watermarked frames can be detected successfully. For 99% level of confidence, the 
confidence interval E  can be estimated by [13]:
E = 2 .5 7 6 .j^ ^ E E
where p\ proportion of successfully detected frames 
n: sample size
As p= 4/30 and n=30, it can be calculated that E=0.1599. Thus for 30 frames/second 5 
minutes clip, or 9000 frames, being watermarked, 1008 to 1391 watermarked frames will 
be detected correctly. These results meets the broadcast requirement where robustness 
against MPEG-2 coding at bit rates as low as 2Mbits/sec is expected [72].
In the next experiment, the watermarked frames were MPEG compressed, 
uncompressed, then attacked by StirMark random geometric and bending. As StirMark 
requires JPEG format, the uncompressed frames in bitmap (BMP) format were converted 
first into JPEG before attacking. These random geometric attacks are quite severe, and the 
PSNR of the attacked frames dropped to around 13 dB. As a consequence, the SIMs in 
the detection were degraded. Figure 5-5 shows the non-oblivious watermark detection of 
the StirMark attacked frames in conjunction with 6 Mbits/sec MPEG compression rate. For 
MPEG-1, the SIMs of 10 out of 30 detected frames are less than the pre-set threshold, so 
that the detection rate becomes 66.67%, whereas for MPEG-2 the detection rate is 50%.
It should be noted that if the StirMark random geometric attack is applied to each 
frame of a video sequence, very annoying effects will appear when the sequence is played. 
The reason is that StirMark has not been designed to attack video sequences but still 
images, and by default the distortions are different for each picture [81,82]. This can be 
avoided by applying the same distortion parameters to every frame. However, if every 
frame is attacked by the same parameter, the counter attack might be done by comparing 
any one frame with its corresponding un-attacked frame then after the distortion parameter 
is found it can be applied to amend other attacked frames.
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Figure 5-5: Robustness Against Stirmark And MPEG Compression
The next experiment was frame dropping and averaging, where the odd frames 
starting from frame number 3 were dropped and were replaced with the average of the 
adjacent frames. Figure 5-6 shows the results of this attack applied to low texture 
watermarking in conjunction with 4 Mbits/s MPEG-1 compression rate, where 96% (29 
out of 30) of the frame can be detected. The same experiment for MPEG-2 compression 
provides 73.33% (22 out of 30) detected frames.
—•—With frame averaging 
-o-- Without frame averaging
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Figure 5-6: Robustness Against Frame Averaging And MPEG-1 Compression
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5.4 Subjective Testing and Imperceptibility Improvement on Video 
Watermarking
The experiment for non-oblivious watermarking discussed in the previous section 
shows that the imperceptibility of our watermarking method, in terms of the PSNR, is 
high. Figure 5-7 shows the PSNRs of 30 frames where the watermark was embedded in the 
high texture blocks with the embedding strength or = 0.02, producing PSNRs around 45 
dB. However, it should be noticed that the PSNR only compares the watermarked frame 
with the original un-watermarked frame, hence there are possible temporal artefacts that 
cannot be measured by the PSNR.
As described by Huang and Shi [51] and Kaewkamnerd and Rao [56], in image 
watermarking, the imperceptibility can be improved by embedding the watermark in the 
places where the human visual system is not too sensitive. We can exploit this by using the 
texture and luminance masking [51,56]. By texture masking, the watermark can be 
embedded more strongly in the blocks with the stronger texture, whereas by luminance 
masking the watermark can be embedded more strongly in the blocks with the brighter 
background.
OC 35 -
15
frame number
Figure 5-7: PSNR vs Frame Number
If these masking factors are to be implemented in video, they should be applied 
carefully as a video sequence has temporal characteristic. In other words, we should be 
aware of any ‘flickering effect’ and such an artefact should be minimized. Based on the
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work on the physiology of the eye [31], the flicker threshold is related to ‘critical fusion 
frequency’ which is defined as the point where the flicker sensation disappears to be 
replaced by the sensation of continuous stimulation. Then, the critical fusion frequency is 
proportional to the logarithm of the luminance of the flickering patch. Or, practically, the 
flicker can be reduced by decreasing the luminance intensity.
The above principle is employed to improve the imperceptibility of our video 
watermarking scheme, by embedding the watermark in the blocks which have luminance 
under a pre-define threshold. By embedding the watermark in these blocks, the flickering 
effect may be decreased.
To test the validity of this approach, subjective tests were applied to five different 
video sequences with four embedding conditions i.e.:
• low texture blocks with any luminance (random)
• low texture blocks with low luminance
• high texture blocks with any luminance (random)
• high texture blocks with low luminance.
Similar embedding strength a  -  0.02 was applied for these embedding methods.
A subjective test, based on the ITU R BT.500-10 recommendation [54], was 
employed to test the imperceptibility of this watermarking method. This method which
was also used by the EBU (European Broadcasting Union) to test several watermarking
methods [34], asks the assessors to view a pair of pictures, each from the same source, but 
one via the process under examination (i.e. watermarking), and the other one directly 
from the original source. The assessors are asked to assess the quality of both. In sessions 
which last up to 30 minutes, they are presented with a series of picture pairs in random 
order, and with random impairments covering all required combinations. At the end of the 
sessions, the mean scores for each test condition and test picture are calculated.
The structure of test material presentation is shown in Figure 5-8. First, some 
training sequences are introduced to the assessors as well as the types of impairment or 
quality factors likely to occur, the grading scale, the sequence, and timing. Then, at the 
beginning of the session several ‘dummy presentations’ are introduced to stabilize the 
observer’s opinion. The data produced from these presentations are not taken into account 
in the results of the test.
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Score Score
Figure 5-8: Objective Test Presentation Structure
The method requires the assessment of two versions of each test picture. One of 
each pair of test sequences (either A or B) is unimpaired. The unimpaired sequence is 
included to serve as a reference, but the observers are not told which is the reference 
sequence. In the series of tests, the position of the reference picture is changed in pseudo 
random fashion. The pairs, with 10 seconds duration each, are played twice and the 
assessors should score after the second time.
The observers are asked to assess the overall quality of each presentation by 
choosing one of the scores shown in the following table:
Table 5-1: Grading Scale
1 bad
2 poor
3 fair
4 good
5: excellent
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The experiments employed fifteen assessors, most of them familiar with the field of image 
or video processing, and five different sequences as shown in Figure 5-9 were used.
(a) Bird
(c) Fishes
(b) Lions in circus
(d) Flower garden
(e) Train
Figure 5-9: Frames from Video Sequences Used in the Experiments
After conducting the experiments, the results were processed as follows [54]. The 
grading of the sequences produced by the assessors were converted to normalized scores in
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range 0 to 100. Then, the mean score assessment for each of the presentations of the 
original and watermarked sequence, were calculated by using:
1 ^
where:
N: number of observers
u-j,^  : score of observer i for test conditiony, sequence k
The mean score results should be presented with the confidence interval which is derived 
from the standard deviation and size of each sample. It is suggested by [54] to use 95% 
confidence interval which is given by: m}* ± Sjj^
where:
S
Jyt = 1 .9 6 - ^  (5-3)
The standard deviation 5^ .^ is calculated by:
 ^ (m ik Ujjk )
i=i N  -1 (5-4)
Finally, the mean score difference between the original and watermarked 
sequences, A ’ should be presented. This can be calculated by:
=Ujj^—Ujj^  (5-5)
where and are the mean score of the original and watermarked sequences
respectively calculated by equation (5-2). The standard deviation of this difference can be 
calculated by [55]:
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where 6"  ^ and are the standard deviation of the original and watermarked sequences 
respectively, calculated by equation (5-4). Finally, can be determined by using equation 
(5-3).
The processed test result is given in Figure 5-10. The vertical axis represents the 
mean score difference between the watermarked and the un-watermarked sequence, ,
where the higher the score difference, the more the assessors can sense the distortion. The 
horizontal axis shows the sequences with the four different embedding methods and two 
different embedding strengths.
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Figure 5-10: Subjective Test Experimental Result
From these test results, it can be seen that embedding in the ‘dark’ blocks is 
preferred in the four sequences consistently in the high and low texture blocks, as indicated 
by the lower score difference. Only in the sequence ‘Bird’, is the mean score difference of 
the ‘High Texture’ lower than the ‘High Texture -  Dark’ and it has the same mean score 
for both ‘Low Texture -  Dark’ and ‘Low Texture’. These results are summarized in Table
5-2.
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Table 5-2: Preferred Embedding Methods
S equences Em beddinq Method
Bird high texture
Lions In circus low texture dark
Fishes low texture dark
Flower garden high texture dark
Train high texture dark
5.5 Video Content Detection to Suit Particular Embedding Scheme
From Table 5-2 above, it can be seen that embedding in the ‘dark’ blocks can 
improve the imperceptibility. However, unlike in image watermarking where the 
imperceptibility is high if the watermark is embedded in the high texture parts [51,56], in 
video, high imperceptibility is not always produced by high texture embedding. The two 
sequences, ‘Lions in circus’ and ‘Fishes’, have better embedding imperceptibility in the 
low texture. Most likely, the internal characteristic of the sequence plays an important role 
for choosing the embedding method if high video imperceptibility is required.
Intuitively, we can assume that the movement part in a frame is more recognisable- 
by the human eyes than any other static part. In other words, the part of a frame which has 
high difference between its adjacent frames is not a good place to embed the watermark.
In this section, the characteristic of each sequence will be analysed, so that the 
relationship between the characteristic and the texture embedding method to obtain high 
imperceptibility can be approximated. Then, by identifying the internal characteristic, a 
specific watermarking embedding method can be chosen for each different video scene.
There are three aspects of a video scene that can be examined, namely the texture 
which can be measured by its edges, the difference between adjacent frames, and its 
luminance. Figure 5-11 shows some examples of the texture and the frame difference for 
the ‘Flower garden’ frames. In order to make the difference clearly seen, it was amplified 
by a factor 10.
First, for each frame, the low texture blocks Tl and the low texture blocks which 
have low difference blocks between frames Dl are marked and counted, so that for all n 
frames, the proportion of low difference blocks within the low texture blocks can be 
calculated by:
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1L D L T R = - y  — (5-7)
Then, the low texture blocks’ luminance are measured, so that the average 
luminance LTL can be calculated. Next, the low texture characteristic LTC can be 
determined, where;
LTC = LDLTR
LTL
(5-8)
Figure 5-11: Textures (left) and adjacent frames differences (right)
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The next step is to find the high texture characteristic. The characteristic, HTC, is 
estimated by the same procedure, measuring the number of high texture blocks T//, the 
number of high texture blocks Dh having low difference blocks between frames, and the 
mean high texture luminance HTL, where
L D H TR ^-yLh. ( 5.9)
HTL
Finally, by comparing these low and high texture characteristics, and setting a 
threshold, the dominant characteristic for every scene can be determined, and a particular 
embedding method can be chosen.
It should be noted that the low texture characteristic {LTC) and high texture 
characteristic {HTC) stated in equations (5-8) and (5-10) respectively, are obtained from two 
basic assumptions. The first is our previously stated intuitive assumption, i.e. the 
movement part in a frame is more recognisable by the human eyes than any other static 
part. For the low texture part, more precisely, the more the low difference blocks to the 
low texture blocks ratio {LDLTR) the less recognisable the embedded watermark is. 
Similarly, for the high texture parts, the more the LDHTR the less perceptible the 
embedded watermark is. The second assumption is related to the result in section 5.4, i.e. 
the lower the luminance the less perceivable the embedded watermark is. This is 
represented by the value of LTL and HTL for the low and high texture parts respectively.
The approach described above was implemented on the five different sequences 
that were used in the experiment, and the result is shown in Table 5-3. The LTC and HTC 
in that table are plotted in the Figure 5-12.
As can be seen in Table 5-3 and Figure 5-12, the LTC values of ‘Lions in circus’ and 
‘Fishes’ sequences are relatively.much higher than the HTC, whereas for other sequences 
the LTC values are smaller or only slightly higher than the HTC. Thus, as the low texture 
parts of these two sequences have less adjacent frame difference and less luminance 
(which means less sensitive to human eyes), the watermark is better embedded in the low 
texture parts. This is consistent with both our first assumption and the subjective test 
results.
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The video characteristic detection as described above is applicable to a single video 
scene. Thus, the video should be divided into scenes that have the same nature or genre. 
The video scene detection is no longer a problem, since there are several scene detection 
methods available, for instance by analysing inter frame similarity matrices [25] or by 
comparing the brightness, the change in pixel values, and the change in colour distribution 
from frame to frame [40].
Table 5-3: Sequence Characteristics
Sequences
LDLTR 
(Mean Low 
Difference blocks to 
Low Texture blocks 
Ratio)
LTL
(Mean Low Texture 
Luminance)
LDHTR 
(Mean Low 
Difference blocks to 
High Texture blocks 
Ratio)
HTL 
(Mean High 
Texture 
Luminance)
Bird 0.1149 0.2351 0.1409 0.2268
Lions in circus 0.3279 0.2941 0.2826 0.3924
Fishes 0.4164 0.2184 0.2333 0.4782
Flower Garden 0.3013 0.7018 0.2730 0.4593
T rain 0.2612 0.4331 0.2301 0.4867
J
Sequences LTC HTC
Bird 0.4887 0.6213
L/ons in circus 1.1149 . 0.7202
Fishes 1.9066 0.4879
Flower Garden 0.4293 0.5944
Train 0.6031 0.4728
2.5 1
□  LTC
Bird Lions in Fishes Flower Train
circus Garden
Sequences
Figure 5-12: Sequence Texture Characteristics
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5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, the extension of image watermarking method to video has been 
presented, and it is shown that the video watermarking scheme is robust against various 
attacks, including MPEG-2 coding at bit rates as low as 2Mbits/sec, as required by the 
broadcasting system [72]. Furthermore, the watermark can be detected with or without the 
presence of the original sequence.
The next contribution of this work is the improvement on imperceptibility by 
reducing flickering effect. In terms of the imperceptibility, it is observed that a method in 
image watermarking can not be used similarly for video watermarking. For image 
watermarking it has been suggested to apply luminance masking by embedding the 
watermark more strongly in parts with the brighter background [51,56]. In contrast, it is 
shown in section 5.4 that for video watermarking, the flickering effect can be reduced by 
embedding the watermark in the darker parts of the video frames.
Another issue which is also related to the imperceptibility is texture masking [51,56]. 
For image watermarking, by texture masking, the watermark can be embedded more 
strongly in the parts with the stronger / high texture. Nevertheless, our experiment shows 
that for some sequences embedding in the low texture of the video sequence is better 
whereas for other sequences it is not. Thus, it is believed that for video watermarking the 
texture masking should be applied by considering the sequence characteristic. For that 
reason, the method to detect scene characteristic to select a particular embedding scheme is 
proposed.
It should be noted that the two latter methods can be used not only in a particular 
watermarking scheme as described in section 5.2, but also in any watermarking algorithm 
which considers the texture and luminance in its embedding scheme.
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Chapter 6
6 Image Ownership and Confidentiality 
Protection
6.1 Introduction
As described in chapter one, there are two main technologies for protecting 
multimedia material. Watermarking can be used to protect the ownership or track its 
distribution, whereas encryption can be applied for protecting its confidentiality.
There are several approaches to encrypt an image. Sobhy and Shehata [95] and 
Fridrich [37] proposed an encrypting system based on a chaotic algorithm. Amomraksa et 
at [10,12] proposed a reduced complexity method where the DOT is applied to the image 
or video, then only small parts of the coefficients are encrypted. A virtual image 
cryptosystem based upon vector quantization, which employs a virtual image to obscure 
the original one, was proposed by Chen et al [24]. ïn this method, the original image is 
encrypted into another virtual image. Since the encrypted image is not meaningless, it is 
expected that the attacker will have no intention to break it.
Our proposed schemes are motivated by those two latter methods. Nevertheless, not 
only the encryption complexity reduction and image camouflaging are concerned, but also 
a file size reduction is expected.
There are two related schemes which are proposed in this chapter. Firstly, an image 
confidentiality protection by camouflaging and encryption using the RSA algorithm is 
introduced. Then, this scheme is applied in conjunction with image watermarking as 
described in chapter four to provide a scheme for protecting both the confidentiality and 
ownership of digital image.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 6.2, before going 
through the details of the proposed schemes, a brief overview of the RSA algorithm is 
given. Section 6.3 describes the camouflaging and encryption schemes in detail. The
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experimental results of this scheme is presented in section 6.4. Security analysis of the 
scheme is provided in section 6.5. Section 6.6 describes another scenario of the 
camouflaging and encryption method. Section 6.7 presents the proposed scheme in 
conjunction with the image watermarking algorithm. Finally, section 6.8 will conclude this 
chapter.
Please note that although the RSA algorithm is chosen in our encryption scheme, in 
principal, any encryption algorithm can be applied.
6.2 RSA Algorithm Overview
The RSA algorithm is an example of public key cryptography. Unlike symmetric 
cryptography which uses the same key to encrypt and decrypt, in public key cryptography 
each person has a pair of keys, one being called the public key and the other called the 
private key. The public key is published, while the private key is kept secret. Anyone can 
send a confidential message by using public information (i.e. encrypting by public key), 
but the message can be decrypted only with a private key, which is owned by the intended 
recipient. A digital signature is another application of the RSA algorithm.
The RSA algorithm, summarized from [91], works as follows:
1. Provide two large primes p  and q, and compute their product n=pq-, n is called the 
modulus.
2. Choose a number e, less than n and relatively prime to (p-l){q-l) which means e and 
(p-l)(ç-l) have no common factors except 1.
3. Find another number d such that {ed-l) is divisible by {p-\){q-l).
The values e and d are called the public and private exponents respectively. The 
public key is the pair {n,e)\ the private key is («,</). The factors p  and q must be destroyed 
or kept in secret with the private key.
It is currently difficult to obtain the private key d from the public key {n,e). 
However if one could factor n into p  and q, then one could obtain the private key d. Thus 
the security of the RSA system is based on the assumption that factoring is difficult.
For an encryption, this algorithm is applied as follows. Suppose A wants to send 
message m to B. A creates ciphertext c by exponentiating c=m  ^mod n, where e and n are
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B’s public key. To decrypt B also exponentiates m=c mod n. The relationship between e 
and d ensures that B correctly recovers m. Since only B knows d, only B can decrypt this 
message.
6.3 Image Confidentiality Protection by Camouflaging and Encryption
In this section, a two step security algorithm as shown in Figure 6-1 is proposed. 
First, the image is camouflaged with a virtual image by using a technique similar to digital 
watermarking. Secondly, the camouflaged image is encrypted, producing a cipherimage. 
Thus, if illegal users try to break it, an image which is not the real one may be reproduced.
> recovered 
image.
original
image
private keypublic key
keys
decryptencryptcamouflage de-camouflage
confidentially 
sent or 
storage
Figure 6-1: Camouflaging and Encryption Method
Furthermore, by selecting appropriate parameters, the size of the cipherimage and 
some other encrypted information can be smaller than the original image. It should be 
noted, however, that the encryption method can be implemented on its own.
Figure 6-2 shows the camouflaging method, where the original image can be 
camouflaged into a virtual image. Firstly, the discrete cosine transform (DCT) and discrete 
wavelet transform (DWT) are applied to the original and the virtual image respectively. 
For further description of DCT and DWT please refer to chapter two, section 2.9.1 and
2.10.1 respectively. Subsequently, for the DCT coefficients, the DC coefficient is changed 
to zéro and the AC coefficients are scaled, and then the original DC coefficient and the 
scale parameters are encrypted. Finally, the transformed coefficients of the images are 
added and the inverse DWT is applied. The inverse of this process is applied to reveal the 
original image.
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Figure 6-2: Camouflaging and De-camouflaging Method
It should be noted that, in the camouflaging, different transforms are chosen in 
order to make the original image perfectly concealed. A comparison of camouflaging 
‘Lena’ image into ‘Bridge’ image using the same and different transforms is illustrated in 
Figure 6-3. In order to make the comparison more clear, the original image coefficients are 
scaled by 0.4 before being added to the virtual image coefficients. It can be seen from 
Figure 6-3(c) that by using the same transform (i.e. DCT), an artefact of thé original image 
can be noticed. The same results is obtained if the DWT transform is used. In contrast, as 
shown in Figure 6-3(d), although the produced image is not perfect, the use of different 
transforms can conceal the original image better.
Nevertheless, there is another possibility of using the same transform without 
producing the original image artefact. This can be performed by shuffling either the 
original or virtual image transform coefficients before the addition. The index of the 
shuffling containing the priginal positions of the coefficients, which is needed to 
reconstruct the image, has to be sent along with the cipher-image. As the size of the 
shuffling index is quite high, we do not use this method.
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(a) original image (b) virtual image
(c) camouflaged image using the same transform (d) camouflaged image using different transforms 
(DCT) (DCT and DWT)
Figure 6-3: Original, Virtual, and Camouflaged Images
The details of encryption method are shown in Figure 6-4. Firstly the 
(camouflaged) image is transformed using the DWT with three levels of decomposition. 
Next, the coefficients in the lowest resolution are encrypted. After changing the 
coefficients in these locations to zeros, the inverse DWT is performed. Finally, another 
image is constructed by placing random encrypted components into the zero matrix in the 
lowest resolution locations and inversing its DWT, is added into this image. Please note 
that in order to keep the data in the valid range, some scale and shift procedures are needed 
before compressing the cipher-image. Hence, the results are ciphertext of: image, low 
resolution coefficients, and scale shift parameters.
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Figure 6-4: Encryption Method
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Figure 6-5: Decryption Method
As shown in Figure 6-5, for decryption the inverse of this procedure is applied. By 
processing only the lowest resolution components, no more than 1/64 part of the 
coefficients will be encrypted. Consequently, the computational time will be reduced 
significantly.
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(a) Positions of DWT coefficients to be removed
(b) Removing coefficients in LL (c) Removing coefficients in HL
(d) Removing coefficients in LH (e) Removing coefficients in HH
Figure 6-6: Tbe Effect Of Removing 4096 DWT Coefficients Comparison
In the encryption, the coefficients in the lowest resolution (LL) are encrypted and the 
original positions are substituted by zero. We choose this part because the lowest 
resolution is the most significant coefficients of the image transform. Thus, removing this
1 0 8
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part can degrade the image quality seriously. This is illustrated in the Figure 6-6, where 
removing the coefficients in various locations are compared.
6.4 Camouflaging and Encryption Experimental Results
To prove the practicability of the schemes described in the previous section, three 
experiments were conducted. First, the encryption method alone was assessed. An original 
image Lena was encrypted, the cipher-image was compressed with various JPEG quality 
levels, then the decrypted image peak signal to noise ratio (PSNR) was observed. The 
simulation showed that for the highest JPEG quality parameter (100), the image can be 
decrypted perfectly with 48 dB PSNR, whereas for JPEG quality 50 the PSNR was 30.88 
dB.
In the second experiment, a virtual image Bridge with size of 211.7 kb was used to 
camouflage the 25.7 kb original image Lena prior to the encryption. With cipherimage 
compression of JPEG quality 99, a decrypted image with PSNR=33.68 dB can be 
achieved. The images of this test can be seen in Figure 6-7(a) to (e).
In the third experiment, the original and virtual image were swapped over 
prior to the tests, so that the size of the virtual image was smaller than the original one. It 
was shown that the original image was camouflaged, encrypted, and recovered 
successfully. Table 6-1 shows the file sizes and the recovered PSNRs of the second and 
third experiments.
It can be seen that if a smaller size of virtual image is chosen, the original image can 
be camouflaged and encrypted efficiently, e.g. 211.7 kb original image can be transformed 
into 194.72 kb cipher and virtual images and some other encrypted parameters. This can be 
even more efficient if one virtual image is used for many original images.
Table 6-1: Image Sizes and PSNRs
Original Virtual Encrypted OtherParameters
Decrypted
PSNR
25.7 kb 211.7 kb 159.01 kb 36.5 kb 33.68 kb
211.7 kb 25.7 kb 132.46 kb 36.6 kb 33.98 kb
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y
(a) original image (b) virtual image
(c) camouflaged image (d) encrypted image
(e) recovered image
Figure 6-7: Tbe Second Experiment Results
110
Chapter 6. Image Ownership and Confidentiality Protection
6.5 Security Analysis
There are several possibilities of attacking this method. If the attackers have any 
knowledge of the algorithm, they can simply subtract the ciphertext of random components 
from the cipher-image. By doing so, the image with zero value of lowest resolution 
coefficients, or similar to the output of point (1*) in Figure 6-4, will be produced. This 
image is shown in Figure 6-6(b). However, this image has no commercial value, and 
furthermore, this illustrates the virtual image, not the original one.
Further effort can be carried out by processing the image shown in Figure 6-6(b) and 
the virtual image (Figure 6-7(b)). As Figure 6-6(b) contains some information about the 
original image, this can be used as the (decrypted) camouflaged image. Then, this image in 
conjunction with the virtual image are processed by the de-camouflaging procedure shown 
in Figure 6-2. As the AC scaling and DC parameters are encrypted, the attackers have to 
guess these values. Assuming these parameters are estimated correctly, an image as shown 
in Figure 6-8 can be produced. It can be seen from this illustration that the recovered 
image is distorted severely.
Figure 6-8: Image Produced By Attackers Which Know The Algorithm
Thus, attacking the RSA algorithm to decode the original lowest resolution 
coefficients and other scaling parameters is needed, if the perfect original image is wanted. 
The security of RSA depends on the problem of factoring a large number, n=pq, where the 
public and private keys are functions of a pair of large prime numbers p and q. Thus, n 
must be chosen to be much larger than the current edge of factoring technology [93].
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6.6 Another Possible Scheme
There is another variant of this image camouflaging and encryption method, i.e. 
camouflaging the original image and encrypting the virtual image. This method is shown 
in Figure 6-9.
recovered
image
original
image
virtual
image decryptencrypt
camouflage de-camouflage
Figure 6-9: Another Camouflaging and Encryption Scheme
An experiment to evaluate the performance of this scenario was carried out using 
211.7 kb ‘Bridge’ image as the original image and 25.7 kb ‘Lena’ image as the virtual 
image, similar to the third experiment described in section 6.4. This method produced an 
encrypted image with size of 67.82 kb, other encrypted parameters with size of 36.96 kb, 
and a recovered image with 36.14 dB PSNR. By comparing these results with the previous 
scheme results shown in Table 6-1, it can be seen that the later method shown in Figure 
6-9 is more efficient and provides higher PSNR.
In terms its security, this method is analysed with the similar approach described in 
section 6.5. First, the attackers can attack the encrypted image (of the virtual image). If 
they know the algorithm, they can subtract the ciphertext of random components from the 
cipher-image to produce an image shown in Figure 6-10(c). Attacking the encrypted image 
is not useful, because even though the attack is successful, the recovered image is similar 
to the camouflaged image which is already available.
Another attack can be performed by processing the camouflaged image along with 
the image produced from the previous attack (Figure 6-10(c)) using the de-camouflaging 
procedure shown in Figure 6-2. If the scaling parameters can be guessed correctly, a very 
low quality image shown in Figure 6-10(d) will be produced.
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(a) Original Image (b) Virtual Image
(c) Image produced by attacking the 
encrypted image
(d) Image produced by attacking the 
camouflaged image
Figure 6-10; Original, Virtual and Attacked Images of the Second Scenario
6.7 Copyright and Confidentiality Protection Scheme
In some cases, we need to protect the copyright of an image then send or store this 
image confidentially. In this section, a scheme as described in the previous sections is used 
in conjunction with a robust watermarking scheme in order to provide both the copyright 
and confidentiality protection system. This method is illustrated in Figure 6-11.
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Figure 6-11: Watermarking in DC Low Texture in conjunction with Encryption
‘c •
First, the watermark is embedded robustly onto the image. Then, the watermarked 
image is camouflaged and encrypted. After this stage, the image can be confidentially sent 
to the legitimate receiver or kept safely. By using the valid keys, the rightful person can 
de-camouflage and decrypt the image, and if it is needed, the watermark can be detected.
To test the performance of this scheme, a watermarking method as described in 
chapter four, section 4.5, was used to embed a watermark in the DC coefficients of the 
block DCT of image Lena with embedding strength a  = 0.008. After camouflaging, 
encryption and JPEG compression, the image was decrypted, de-camouflaged and the 
watermark was detected. As can be seen from Figure 6-12, the watermark can be detected 
successfully.
200 400 600 800
Watermark Data Index
1000
Figure 6-12: Watermark Detection from an Encrypted Image
6.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, methods for securing image confidentiality have been presented. Two 
levels of security are proposed. The original image can be either encrypted directly or 
camouflaged then encrypted. Alternatively, the original image is camouflaged and the
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virtual image is encrypted. Subsequently, the camouflaged and cipher-image can be saved 
in a JPEG compression format.
In the encryption, only selected image DWT coefficients are encrypted. By using this 
approach the processing time can be reduced. The simulations showed the efficiency of 
this proposed methods, i.e. the encrypted image size along with others cipher data can be 
smaller than the original image size.
In addition, this proposed image confidentiality protection can be applied in 
conjunction with a watermarking scheme to protect its copyright. When a watermarked 
image is camouflaged and encrypted, the embedded watermark can be detected 
successfully from the recovered image.
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Chapter 7
7 Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Conclusions
The main coverage of this thesis is concerned with the problems of securing the 
ownership of digital images and video by using robust watermarking. In addition, image 
confidentiality protection by means of encryption is also addressed.
From the explanations in chapter two, there are at least two important issues in 
digital watermarking, i.e. robustness and imperceptibility. The watermarking schemes 
should be robust against different types of attacks. Additionally, the embedded watermark 
should be transparent to the viewer so that the quality of the image or video is not visibly 
distorted. One of the attacks which is difficult to combat is called the StirMark random 
geometric and bending attack [81,82]. Currently, most commercial watermarking tools are 
not resistant to the local random alterations integrated in StirMark [101].
The major contributions of this thesis are the development of watermarking schemes 
which are robust against various attacks including the StirMark random geometric and 
bending attack. The novelties of this work can be described concisely as follows:
a. An Improvement Of Complementary Modulation Watermarking Method
To improve the robustness. Lu et al [66,67,68] suggested an image watermarking 
method by embedding the watermark in positive and negative modulation. An 
enhancement of this method for binary watermark is proposed by applying an error 
correcting code, separating the data and parity in the embedding and using erasure / 
non erasure in the detection. By using this method, the robustness against various 
attacks is increased.
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b. Comments on Existing Method to Combat StirMark
Lu et al [66,67,68] also suggested a method to combat the StirMark random geometric 
attack. In their method, a DWT coefficient relocation is employed prior to the 
detection. Nevertheless, our experiment of this method shows that a false positive 
detection occurs if any image without watermark is processed as a suspect image.
c. A Method to Combat StirMark by Pixels Replacement
Another method to combat the random geometric attack is proposed. By replacing the 
distorted pixels of the attacked image before the detection, the watermark can be 
detected successfully. This method does not produce a false positive detection if an un­
watermarked image is processed. Furthermore, this method can be used in conjunction 
with DCT or DWT watermarking methods.
d. Textured Based Image Watermarking Methods
Three possible robust watermarking schemes are proposed. These methods consider 
the texture of the image and embed the watermark in the most significant components, 
i.e. the DC coefficients of the image DCT. These schemes are robust against random 
geometric attack. In high texture watermarking detection, the original positions of the 
distorted blocks are located by the help of the image edges cross correlation. Thus, 
depending on the image nature, the watermark can be embedded in the low or high 
texture alone or in both.
e. An Oblivious Detection Method by Image Pre-Processing
In the above proposed schemes, the un-watermarked original image is needed for the 
detection. However, in some cases the original image cannot be made available to the 
detector. This can be resolved by an oblivious detection method. In our proposed 
method, the original image is pre-processed first. Then the watermark is embedded in 
one sub-set of the transform coefficients whereas another sub-set is applied for the 
detection. The simulations of this method in two different embedding methods showed
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their robustness. Furthermore, compared to the existing detection method proposed by
[86], this method has an advantage, i.e. shorter length of watermark can be used.
/. An Extension Of Image Watermarking Method To Video
The extension of our image watermarking method to video is applied by embedding 
the watermark on a frame by frame basis in the un-compressed domain. It is shown that 
the video watermarking scheme is robust against various attacks including MPEG-2 
coding at bit rates as low as 2 Mbits/sec as required by the broadcasting system [72]. 
Furthermore, the watermark can be detected with or without the presence of the 
original sequence.
g. A Video Watermarking Imperceptibility Improvement
In this method, the watermark transparency in a video is improved by reducing the 
flickering effect. It is observed that a method in the image watermarking for improving 
the imperceptibility can not be used directly to the video watermarking. For image 
watermarking it was suggested to apply luminance masking by embedding the 
watermark stronger in the parts with the brighter background [51,56]. In contrast, for 
video watermarking, our experiments showed that the flickering effect can be reduced 
by embedding the watermark in the darker parts of the video frames.
h. A Video Characteristic Detection Method
Texture masking [51,56], which can be applied to improve the watermark 
imperceptibility, is investigated. For image watermarking, by texture masking the 
watermark can be embedded more strongly in the parts with the strong / high texture. 
However, our experiments showed that for video watermarking this is not always the 
case. For some sequences embedding in the low texture is better whereas for other 
sequences it is not. Therefore, it is believed that for video watermarking the texture 
masking should be applied by considering the sequence characteristic. Hence, a 
method to detect scene characteristic to select a particular embedding scheme is 
proposed.
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It should be noted that the two latter methods (g. and A.), i.e. flicker reduction and 
video characteristic detection methods, can be used not only in our proposed 
watermarking scheme but also in any watermarking algorithm which considers the 
texture and luminance in its embedding scheme.
An Image Confidentiality Protection Scheme
Methods for securing image confidentiality by using two levels of security have been 
presented. The original image can be either encrypted directly or camouflaged then 
encrypted. In the encryption, only selected image DWT coefficients are encrypted. By 
using this approach the processing time can be reduced. The cipher-image can be saved 
in a JPEG compression format. Furthermore the encrypted image size along with 
others cipher data can be smaller than the original image size. In addition, this 
proposed image confidentiality protection can be applied in conjunction with a 
watermarking scheme to protect its copyright.
7.2 Future Work
There are several ideas for future work related to the proposed schemes described in 
Chapters three to six. These include further development of the proposed schemes and the 
addressing of other issues which are not covered by this thesis. These ideas will be 
described briefly as follows:
a. Modification of the Proposed Schemes Into Type I  Watermark
The robust watermarking methods proposed in this thesis can be categorized into type 
n  watermark detection which produces watermark present / non present output. This 
can be expanded into type I watermark which returns several bits or symbol. Please 
refer to section 2.6 for further discussion of watermark detection type. There are two 
possible scenarios in developing the type I detection:
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• Naive approach
In this approach, methods similar to the proposed schemes can be applied. Then 
instead of calculating the similarity using equation (2-19), the extracted and decoded 
watermark is read as a detected payload. The robustness can be improved by 
shortening the payload and using a more powerful error control code. Thus, the 
task is to find the best code which is suitable for the embedding method.
• Concatenated approach
In this case, several type II schemes with shorter watermark lengths are applied. 
Then, for each payload bit, the similarity between the extracted and the original 
watermark is calculated. The consecutive output of each detection can be read as 
the payload bits. It is necessary to find the optimum watermark length and the most 
suitable error control code.
In both approaches the robustness performance would be assessed by investigating the 
bit error rates for a variety of attacks.
b. Oblivious Watermarking in Other Transform Domain
In chapter four, section 4.9, a blind or oblivious watermarking method which does 
not require the original image in the detection is proposed. This method is carried out 
by pre-processing the DCT coefficients before watermark embedding.
This approach might be applied for other transform domains. An investigation of 
using this method for various transform domain which consider the robustness and 
transparency is needed.
c. Image Fingerprint Detection to Find the Corresponding Secret Key
For a watermarking scheme, the positions of the coefficients which are used to 
place the watermark and other parameters such as the embedding strength are 
considered as a secret key. This key is known by the sender and receiver only. In a real 
application, if many images are involved, a method to find the correct secret key for 
each image should be provided.
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Thus, we propose such a method by the help of a looked up table. A table which 
consists of an image unique property and its corresponding secret key is created. In 
cryptography, hash functions can be used to produce a fingerprint by extracting a 
fixed-length bit string from a variable-length input message [93]. This idea can be used 
to extract the image unique property. In the hash function, the output will be changed if 
the input is changed. Consequently, standard hash functions such as MD5 or SHA-1 
cannot be used on image watermarking, since the data will be altered by the watermark 
embedding or attacking [100]. Instead, a visual hash or an image hash as discussed in 
[38,39,100] can be used.
This approach can be applied not only for images but also for video watermarking 
by locating the secret key for each frame. Furthermore, this can be applied for a non 
blind watermarking. Thus, in video watermarking, this method can be employed to find 
the corresponding original frames which are needed for the detection. The proposed 
method is illustrated in Figure 7-1.
Visual
Hash
Secret Key Table
Frame-1 Key-1
Frame-2 Key-2
Frame-3 Key-3
Frame-n Key-n
Figure 7-1: Locating Frame Key by Feature Extraction
Therefore, the objective of this work is to find a robust visual hashing method for 
the above scheme or to find a more efficient approach for locating the corresponding 
key or frame.
d. Video Watermarking in Compressed Domain
The proposed video watermarking method described in chapter five is performed 
by embedding the watermark on a frame by frame basis in the un-compressed domain. 
For watermarking a compressed video, it should be un-compressed, watermarked and 
re-compressed before transmitting. Likewise, in the detection it should be un­
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compressed before watermark extraction. In order to reduce the processing time, this 
can be modified so that the embedding can be performed in the compressed domain.
It should be noted that the imperceptibility improvement and scene characteristic 
detection methods proposed in section 5.4 to 5.5 might be applied in conjunction with 
watermarking in the compressed domain as well.
Therefore, the aim of this work is to design a watermarking method for the 
compressed domain which is robust, transparent and provides a fast processing time.
e. Robust Asymmetric Watermarking
Most of the current watermarking methods, including our methods described in 
chapter three, four and five, use a symmetric key. By using this method the same key is 
used in the embedding and detection. Thus, the secrecy of the key is shared by the 
embedder and detector. In situations where the detector must be available to the public, 
the secrecy can be divulged by tampering with the detector [94]. Then, by knowing the 
key the watermark might be removed [35].
Regarding this problem, several methods analogous to public key cryptography, 
such as those described in [94], [35], have been proposed for using asymmetric 
watermarking. However, [35] reported that currently none of the asymmetric 
watermarking schemes is sufficiently robust against malicious attacks.
As the proposed watermarking methods described in chapter four are robust, there 
is a possibility to apply their approach in developing a robust asymmetric 
watermarking scheme.
/. Application of the Proposed Watermarking Schemes in Conjunction with a Secure 
Protocol
As addressed in the above description, in most of the current watermarking 
schemes used to deter piracy, the owner typically reveals the watermark in the process 
of verifying piracy. Once revealed, a watermark can be removed. Graver [28] 
addressed a difficult problem in watermarking, which is that of providing enough 
information to verify the presence of one’s watermark without revealing enough
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information to remove the watermark. He proposed zero-knowledge watermarking 
based on a zero-knowledge protocol [93], where one can prove knowledge of a fact 
without revealing that knowledge to another party. Golapakrishnan et al [41] proposed 
another method to eliminate this limitation by using cryptographic protocols to 
demonstrate the presence of a watermark without revealing it.
In order to obtain the optimal security, the robustness of the embedded watermark 
against both signal processing types attacks and protocol types attacks is needed. So, 
the task is to find the best combination of a robust watermarking scheme, such as 
proposed in chapter four, with a robust protocol.
7.3 Concluding Remarks
In summary, this thesis addressed some important issues in securing digital images 
and video, particularly using digital watermarking. Several original contributions have 
been presented, and a number of ideas for future work proposed. The advances in robust 
watennarking, oblivious detection and video watermarking represent a significant 
contribution to the state of the art.
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